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In 1949 Sweden elected not to join NATO and declared a
security policy which remains in effect today: non-
alignment in peace, neutrality in war. To conduct this
policy, Sweden must have a credible deterrent. In this
context, the defense doctrine is one of "total defense," in
which all aspects of Swedish society (military, civilian,
economic) are coordinated in a total effort to ensure the
survival of the nation. But the doctrine may not be effec-
tive without the support of outside forces, and some Swedish
military planners admit that they rely on NATO support
within seven days of any outbreak of hostilities with the
Warsaw Pact, making Sweden a "trip- wire" for NATO.
This paper examines the Swedish defense doctrine in
terms of military force structure, framed in the political
debate of the past decade. It discusses the difficulties
facing Sweden in regard to modernizing her armed forces, and
suggests that Sweden is now, and will continue to be, a
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
'•Even if we consider ourselves to be neutral,
we know where we belong."
Tor st en Gustafsson
Swedish minister of Defense
A. BACKGROUND TO SWEDISH DEFENSE POLICY
On 9 August 19 14 most of the Russian Baltic fleet
steamed out of Helsinki harbor and headed foe the island of
Gotland in the mid-Baltic. The intention of the fleet's
commanding officer was to seek out and attack those units of
the Swedish fleet he presumed were assembled in the Faro
Channel. He left behind a liaison officer in Helsinki who
was to keep in touch with the Russian naval command in St.
Petersburg. Halfway to Gotland, the fleet was ordered back
for the naval command in St. Petersburg was not sure of the
accuracy of reports that Swedish and German war ships were
rendezvousing in the Ealtic for the purpose of launching an
attack on Russian naval units and ports, even though the
government strongly suspected that Sweden would relinquish
neutrality. And they could not ignore the ambiguous state-
ment made ty Swedish Foreign Minister Wallenberg to the
British, Gen an and Russian ministers that if Great 3ritain
went to war against Germany, it would be difficult for
Sweden to keep out of the conflict on account of
anti-Russian sentiments at home.
The Warsaw Pact possesses clear numerical conventional
superiority in Europe, and unfortunately for NATO major
parts of the Baltic coasts are in the hands of littoral
states of the WTO and neutral Sweden. On the one hand this
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considerably impedes the operations of NATO forces in the
regions, and on the other it benefits the Warsaw Pact in
many respects. Any plans by either side must take Sweden
into account, if only because of the geographic significance
of the country. Sweden's location, providing access to the
North Sea and Atlantic through the Baltic approaches, is
important to any plans for control of the sea lines of
communication so vital to the West. In addition, Sweden's
neutrality helps to maintain the balance in the region,
countering the position of Finland to tue East. But any
thoughts by an aggressor that Sweden is a prize simply
waiting to be taken need to be re-examined.
Aptly characterized as a "lesser power" , Sweden is
nevertheless the fourth largest country in Europe. The
standard of living is one of the highest in the world, and
Sweden possesses an industrial base both modern and full of
potential. Swedish technology, particularly in electronics,
has for years been synonymous with quality, and defense
equipment is up to the same high standards. More important,
though, is that Sweden— while not a primary target in the
event of any all-out conflict between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact—constitutes an important potential transit route for
aircraft, ground forces and (most recently) cruise missiles.
In addition, the capture and use of Swedish airfields would
be an important asset for the Soviet Union, for in the
absence of conventional carrier-torn aircraft this would
considerably extend the (JSSR's air coverage over the
Norwegian Sea and the Baltic. [Ref- 1].
With her size and wealth, it might be assured that
Sweden's defense policy would parallel that of the major
powers. And as a capitalistic- oriented country it might be
logical to envision Sweden in NATO. But while there is no
question that her general orientation is toward the West in
security, trade, social, political and psychological terms,
she chooses to remain outside the Alliance. Sweden
consciously adopted a position in 1943 to regain a neutral
buffer state with an indigenously strong defense capability.
This pursuit of the traditional Swedish neutrality remains
in existence today.
Sweden's armed neutrality is clear, simple and under
certain circumstances fully credible. The country's
security objectives are to maintain the nation's indepen-
dence and its freedom of action while safeguarding the
internal development of the country as defined by Sweden
alone, while at the same time working for international
peace and conciliation.
The neutrality of Sweden is of its own chDDsing and not
the subject of, or result of, international treaties or
guarantees. Egil Ulstein, Norway's Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia in 1966, has said that "there are certain
fundamental principles in the policy of Swedish neutrality
which must remain fixed notwithstanding changes in the
foreign policy situation. These may be expressed under the
following points:
1. Sweden is resolved to refuse steadfastly to yield to
pressures and threats from foreign powers;
2. Sweden is resolved to protect her freedom from alli-
ance and safeguard her neutrality from infringements,
incidents, and interference from any foreign power
that attempts them and whether they occur in peace-
time, as an element of a major war or as a prelude to
a war undertaking directed against Sweden;
3. Sweden is resolved to protect her freedom and inde-
pendence against every military attack from any other
country
;
4. Sweden is resolved to— in so far as opportunities to
organize military resistance are not neg lected--to
protect her people (=the physical survival);
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5. Sweden is resolved to sustain, even under the worst
imaginable circumstances, the endeavors of her people
to realize their feeling of national affinity and
cohesion and the democratic social order (=the
psychological survival). [Ref. 2].
As a means of achieving these goals, Sweden continues to
practice a policy of "nonalignment aiming for neutrality in
a future war." The Swedes maintain that this policy
contributes to international peace and stability as well as
to their own national security. However, in order to play
this role as an intermediary peacemaker
,
the military forces
must be strong enough to convince ooth of the blocs that the
cost of any military attack, against Sweden will be too nigh
to risk. Directed as it is toward both sides, Sweden none-
theless views the Soviet Union as the major threat.
In spite of the proclaimed policy of neutrality, all
preparations for defense have been geared to meet an attack
or incursion by Soviet forces. Swedish officers have openly
admitted that the only threat which Sweden faces is from the
Warsaw Pact, and a typical grouni force exercise in March
1982 was conducted to fight off "an invader from the East."
[Fef. 3]. Thus, if the Soviet Union decides to attempt to
extend its military control to the Northern Flank of NATO,
the success of such an operation could not depend on simul-
taneous moves into North Norway (a relatively weak region)
and Sweden.
Sweden becomes strategically significant, though, if the
Soviet Union initiates a large scale military operation
against the Northern Flank in an attempt to occupy Denmark
and Norway, thereby gaining absolute control of the 3altic
and Eaitic Approaches. In this case, Sweden becomes an
important transit area for moving military logistics and
supplies from the Soviet Union to Norway. By transporting
them by rail or road across Sweden, they woull reach Soviet
1 1
operational bases in the occupied ireas more safely and
quickly than by northern or southern sea route. Sweden is
well aware of this contingency, and military doctrine is
developed accordingly. Swedish Air Force contingency plans
call for striking at bridges and otner targets in northern
Finland [Eef. 3] to slow any Soviet advance there and hamper
resuppiy efforts, should Finland choose not to resist a
Soviet move toward Sweden and Norway.
In the past, Sweden often repeated statements that if
her fellow Scandinavian countries became engaged in armed
conflicts, Sweden would deliberately remain out of the
struggle. It was believed that it was important to convince
Soviet leaders that Sweden would not under any conceivable
circumstances become involved in an armed conflict unless
openly and deliberately attacked. The line of reasoning
continued that by maintaining a strict neutrality, Sweden
could prevent the Soviets from planning any preemptive
strike against them as a corollary to any move toward the
Atlantic. Accordingly, tne Soviets would te forced to
advance either to the North or the South.
In light of the Soviet buildup on tne Kola peninsula,
however, and with the addition of Backfire bombers and more
amphibious units to the naval inventory in the Baltic,
Sweden has become more skeptical about the Soviets'
proclaimed intention to respect Swedish neutrality. The
continued sightings of foreign submarines in Swedish waters,
and the grounding of a Soviet Whiskey class submarine near
Karlskrona in October 1981, have caused the Swedish govern-
ment to begin a major evaluation of of the credibility of
its armed neutrality vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. [Ref. 4],
Surrounded by buffer states, Sweden has until recently
been able to maintain a position of non-aligned neutrality
and has acted as a balancing power. This role demands a
considerable air defense capability. In 1981-2 the Swedish
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Air Force consisted of 410 combat aircraft, compared with
479 in the Federal Republic of Germany and 453 in France.
Almost half of these were the modern Swedish-built Viggen.
The full mobilization strength of the army was 700,000.
However, while the costs of equipment have been steadily
growing, the traditional Swedish readiness to sacrifice
considerable resources to defense has been gradually eroded.
In the period 1963-1977 real growth allocation of resources
for education was 81%, in the public health sector 114"? and
in welfare 204%; defense was reduced by bf. From 19 69 to
1980 defense expenditure sank from 4.0ft to 3.2T- of GNP.
[Ref. 5].
In addition, the length of military service for
conscripts has been shortened for most ca tegories--f r om 10
months in 1963 to 7.5 months since 1973, one of the shortest
in the world. In 1977 the training period for reserves was
reduced by 50%, although the full period is scheduled to be
restored at some future date. [Ref. 6],
While the Air Force has been kept up to date and main-
tains a high level of training, botn the Army and the Navy
have suffered from economic constraints. military critics
have claimed that the best equipped infantry -brigades of
today are not much better than the best German divisions of
1940. The number of armored brigades has been reduced from
six to four, and even though they are equipped with 33 new
Swedish-built medium tanks, they also have 340 old British
Centurions which, overhauled, will have to last into the
1990's. There are also shortages of artillery ammunition,
serious weaknesses in air defense, and a severe lack of
equipment for night fighting. The medical service has also
been a victim of economic circumstances.
The Navy has been cut drastically daring the last twenty
years. By 1982 it was smaller than the Norwegian Navy and
of about the same class as the Navy of Denmark, although the
13
compostion of each is significantly different. When the
Soviet submarine ran aground in October 1981, the deficien-
cies of the Swedish Navy, coastal defense and surveillance
system were dramatically revealed. Although Sweden was
testing a new an ti-sutmarine torpedo in the area, the
intruder, apparently on an intelligence mission, was discov-
ered only accidentally by a fisherman twelve hours after it
was on the rocks. The Swedish Navy was reported at the time
to be capable of hunting only two hostile submarines at a
time. [Eef. 7].
Significant emphasis is placed on minefields along the
coast from the Aland Islands to Bornhoi-lm, with some mine-
fields in place in peacetime. The extension of territorial
waters to twelve miles is thought to give mine defense an
additional advantage. However, the exact delimitation of
the territorial waters between Sweden and the USSR is in
dispute, and the stock of mines is said to be insufficient.
B. INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT DEFENSE QUESTION
The five year defense plan voted in 1977 was the first
since 1932 to be presented by a non-socialist government,
the Social Democrats having been voted ' out of office in the
1976 election. The 1977 defense debate showed less agree-
ment between the parties than had been the case previously,
reflecting an increase in pacifist leaning in the Swedish
Social Democratic Party. In this respect the 1972 Party
Congress was a watershed, for on that occasion the party
voted 174-163 in favor of a proposal by Mrs. Maj-Britt
Theorin, the leading spokesperson of the pacifist movement,
against the development of a new advanced military aircraft
(to replace the Viggen in about 1990). The proposal also
recommended that attention be paid to "non-military forms of
defense". At the following Congress, in 1975, a number of
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floor proposals developed themes which were becoming fash-
ionable in pacifist circles in all Nordic countries at the
time: reducing military defense in favor of "economic,
civil and psychological defense". The real security
problem, it was argued, was the poverty of ths underdevel-
oped world, therefore defense appropriations should be
transferred to development aid.
In 1976 the Socialists were voted out of office, to some
extent because of the radicalization of the Party since
1969, when Olof Palme took over from the moderate Tage
Erlander. The Party's opposition role, however, strength-
ened its trend toward radicalization and pacifism. Through
the present period, the debate has come to focus on the
question of the next generation of military aircraft, since
a final decision in the matter is becoming inescapable.
[Ref. 8].
Traditionally, the credibility of Swedish neutrality has
been related to the country's ability to pro3uce her own
weapons. Even today Sweden is 80/t self-sufficient in arma-
ment production, but with the soaring costs of high tech-
nology, it is becoming more and more difficult for her to
maintain this posture. The development of the Viggen for a
number of years accounted for about 10% of all Swedish
Research and Development funds. On the other hand, the
maintenance of a modern aircraft industry will only be
possible if the Government decides to develop a new-
generation JAS design- (J for Jakt, or fighter; A for
Attack; S for Spaning, or reconnaissance) . In contrast to
the Viggen, which was developed in three different models,
the new aircraft should be multi-role and convertible to any
of the three functions at short notice, thereby giving the
Air Force much greater flexibility.
If Sweden does not decide to build her own aircraft,
according to Eric Kronmark, the former Conservative Minister
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of Defense, she will probably have to ouy the American F-16.
Yet even the production of the JkS. might be difficult to
reconcile with the Swedish concept of neutrality, for in
order to make its production economically viable, it would
probably be necessary to slacken the severe constraints on
arms exports, thus increasing the production run and
bringing costs down. A preliminary calculation made in 1981
indicated that a Swedish-built JAS might be twice as expen-
sive as the American alternatives. Arms exports currently
account for only about 1% of Sweden's total exports, but
according to Bofors--one of Sweden's leading arms
producers— this could be expanded considerably, increasing
employment in the armaments industry from 40,330 to 47,000.
Any liberalization, however, encounters strong opposition
not only from the Socialists but also from the youth move-
ments of the Liberal and Centre Parties. [Ref. 9].
Pacifist groups are also arguing that Sweden does not
really need a high-technology Air Force at all, since she is
not being threatened by anyone, and even if she were, she
co ild not resist the super-power most likely to do the
threatening. Defense planners respond to this by stating
that Sweden would not have to take on the full strength of a
super-power, but only the marginal forces which it could
spare for Sweden, and that a modern Air Force is absolutely
indispensable for a credible defense for at least two
reasons: Sweden's territorial defense is based entirely on
mass mobilization and therefore reguires maximum warning,
which can only be guaranteed through efficient surveillance;
and the increasing strategic importance of the Scandinavian
area has increased the temptation to violate Swedish air
space through the use of technologically improved aircraft,
cruise missiles and advanced surveillance systems.
The changing attitudes toward defense which have charac-
terized Sweden since the early 1970's have spilled over to
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her NATO neighbors in the West. Several more or less inde-
pendent chains of causes for this shift can be identified.
Most easily recognized are the rising costs of military
equipment, which have coincide! with a deteriorating
economic situation in the wake of the 1974 oil-price escala-
tion. Sweden managed to postpone the impact of the interna-
tional oil crisis for several years, but then she was badly
hit as were all other oil-importing countries. This occured
coQcurrently with the continuing rise of pacifism, which hai
been growing steadily since the anti-Vietnam War movement
began to rise in the late 1960's. 2uite strong in Sweden,
the movement gradually evolved into a general pacifism in
the 1970's, increasing in influence as its members moved
into positions of power in the political parties.
Ideologically motivated activists found it easier to obtain
postions of control, in the Socialist Party in particular,
as the rising standard of living weakened the economic moti-
vation of the population in general for participating in
party activities. [ Eef . 10].
The growing influence of women, another conseguence of
the trends of the 1960's, strengthened pacifist trends.
Within the Swedish Socialist Party the women's organization
became particularly active in promoting pacifist views.
Politicians like Maj-Britt Theorin and Alva Xyrdal became
very prominent in the defense debate. Myrdal's work in
particular stimulated debate, and she contributed to the
campaign for a treaty-based nuclear-free Northern zone with
her 1990 proposal for a zone incorporating Sweden and
Finland. In Norway the Myrdal proposal encouraged those
already engaged in a vigorous campaign promoting a Northern
(Scandinavian) nuclear-free zone.
Yet Mrs. Myrdal is not an extreme pacifist. She recom-
mends strengthening Sweden's air defenses, the air Force and
the Navy for surveillance and for defense against the
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violations of Swedish neutrality/ as well as "balanced
defense forces" for ilorrland and the Skane coast, and civil
defense preparations. She is also in favor of increasing
military stockpiles and Swedish self-reliance in general.
Pacifism in the Swedish Socialist Party has been
promoted as well by the party's religious wing, the
"Movement of 3rotherhood. " Their position was strengthened
by the regional climate of the 1970's with detente culmi-
nating in the 1975 CSCE Meeting in Helsinki. In the
follow-up conferences in 3elgrade and Madrid, Sweden worked
closely with Finland to ensure a continuation of the detente
policy despite the new tensions created by the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan. The Stockholm-based Swedish
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) contributed
very actively to stimulating interest in disarmament and
arms control. In the Swedish context this was sometimes
translated into the argument that disarmament begins at
home/ although the government position that a non-aligned
policy demands a strong defense with the main responsibility
for disarmament falling on the super-powers. However, the
"Whiskey on the rocks" episode of October 1981/ followed by
the declaration of martial law in Poland--a country very
close to the Swedes for historical and geographical
reasons—caused a considerable reduction in the rhetoric and
influence of the pacifists. [Ref. 6],
Swedish officers have openly admitted that the only
threat which Sweden considers real is from the Warsaw Pact.
Colonel Lars B. Persson, former Commander of Kallax Air
Force Wing in Northern Sweden has stated that it is only a
matter of holding out for seven days, after which NATO will
have sufficient reinforcements in place to mate the outcome
of any confrontation with the WTO too uncertain for the
Soviets. This comment created considerable debate in the
Swedish parliament. Torsten Gustafsson, then Minister of
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Defense, assured Parliament that Sweden did not anticipate
any cooperation with NATO, tut a ienial of the statement by
Persson and his superior officer, General Bertil Nordstrom,
was decried in the press. It was also reported at the time
that General Nordstrom himself had said that he thought a
one month hold-out period to be more realistic than seven
days
.
The debate also caused some embarrassment in Finland,
for it was here that the Swedish contingency plans for
interdiction in Finland were revealed. Swedish experts,
however, were optimistic in their evaluation of their capa-
bility to resist a Soviet advance towards Northern Norway.
They argued that such an advance could not be prepared
without ample warning (no "bolt from the blue") , and that
the swampy terrain in Northern Sweden would tie Soviet
forces to the roads where they would be particularly vulner-
able to both the Swedish Air Force and the notile asset
highly specialized Northern brigades. [Ref. 3].
In the eyes of the Soviet Union, the credibility of
Swedish neutrality had been weakened, and it was further
weakened by American Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger's visit to Sweden— the first ever by an American
Secretary of Defense— shortly after the Soviet submarine
grounding, as well as by Swedish-American negotiations on
technical cooperation in defense production.
Nevertheless, the Swedes still voice some concern about
the possibility of Western threats to Swedish neutrality, if
only in the form of cruise-missiles violating Swedish air
space after being fired from the Norwegian Sea enroute the
Soviet Union. To this end, the defense planning for the
five year period 1982-1987 specifically recommends strength-
ening anti-cruise missile defenses thorough the procurement
of airborne early warning radar systems. [Ref. 11].
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In early 1982 the Government decided to begin procure-
ment of the new JAS subject to further considerations,
although the calculated price already exceeiei the costs of
the NATO-built Tornado. A few weeks after the submarine
grounding incident, the Navy was given permission for a
substantial ship-building program in Swedish naval yards,
including four submarines of the A - 1 7 class, claimed to be
the most modern of its type, and two missile patrol boats
with anti-submarine warfare (ASF) capaoiiity. Pith specific
reference to the U- 137 submarine incident, the Government
proposed in its 1982-87 Defense Plan a 200 million kroner
increase in the ASF budget. Ihere was a serious unemploy-
ment problem in Swedish shipyards at the time, and the
Government had decided previously on a substantial building
program, but the time-table for the program was moved up as
a result of the incident.
The increases in the Navy budget will have some effect
on the Army in the form of reductions in its peace-time
organization. To prove that it is still a force to be reck-
oned with, the Swedish Army in March 1982 conducted an exer-
cise involving 23,000 men in the north, the largest such
war-game since the Second World War. It was designed as a
signal that Sweden was well aware of the growing strategic
importance of the northern region, a consideration high-
lighted by the ever-increasing Soviet military buildup on
the Kola Peninsula. [Ref. 1 ].
Over the years, and particularly during the first Palme
period, it had become common for Western military authori-
ties to downplay the ability of the Swedish military and the
importance of the role it plays in NATO's plans. Even so,
Sweden has provided yeoman service for western defense by
providing political and military balance in the North that
has greatly benefited NATO— much more so than if Sweden had
been a member of the Alliance. Without the Swedish
20
contribution, NATO would have had to shift large forces,
particularly air, for Norwegian and Danish defense from an
already difficult military balance on the Central Front.
While there were indications in the 1970' s that this period
of Swedish "assistance" was coming to an end under Palme,
the conservative Center Party (Centerpar tiet, the former
Agrarian Party) government under Thorbjorn Falldin which
replaced Palme began to attempt to counter this trend, even
in the face of serious economic difficulty. This policy nas
been continued into the 1980's, even under Palme's new
government which returned to office in 1982.
That Sweden will maintain her armed neutrality is not
the issue. The key guestion is whether Sweden can continue
to afford a military, and build a strategy around, a compe-
tent high-technology air and naval force, on whether she
will have to shift to a cheaper, less capable one. The
high-technology option gives Sweden a politically visible
presence and force projection capability which is mandatory
for maintaining the present balance in the Scandinavian
region. The lesser-capability option means that Sweden will
only be able to defend her own territory, not the Baltic at
large. The first option, although tacitly drawing on the
assumed guarantees of NATO assistance in time of crisis,
gives weight to Swedish concerns and desires while making
Sweden a genuine contributor to Nordic and global security.
The second option places Sweden in a vacuum, forced to draw
exclusively on the security guarantees of potentially
hostile neighbors.
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II. SWEDISH DEFENSE PCLICI: 'HE AHS?
A. EVAL0ATIN3 THE THREAT
Recognizing that the primary (only) threat of invasion
comes from the Soviet Union, Swedish Defense policy has been
developed as a total defense concept, one which reflects the
ability of Sweden to mobilize an armed force of 700,000 men
in .ess than 96 hours. The defense plan i divided into
three phases, each of which represents a deteriorating stra-
tegic condition:
1. Phase 1: A "shell defense", using the well-equipped,
nigh readiness units of the Air Force and Navy to
meet and stop enemy invasion forces while they are in
transit across the 3altic.
2. Phase II: A defense condition which comes into use
should an invasion force actually reach the Swedish
coast. It calls for the use of the Phase 1 units and
the coastal artillery (under Navy coiamacd) . and the
most rapidly mobilizeatle Army units. Important here
is ability of the local defense forces to be opera-
tional 6-12 hours after call-up and fieii army "rapid
battalions" within 24 hours.
3. Phase III: The defense in ieptu of Swedish territory
if the enemy has gained a beachhead. In this case,
the units used in the first two phases are regrouped
and combined with the fully mobilized ground forces.
These begin to become operational in battalion
strength 2-3 days after call-up, and in division
strength after a. Phase III is designed to delay the
enemy, cut him off from his supplies, extend his
lines of communication, weaken him, and finally
22
destroy him. The geography of Sweden is tailor-made
for this kind of plan, should it be necessary.
[Ref. 1 ].
The Soviets have often made claims that Sweden is a
partner in the NATO alliance, although this charge has never
been substantiated. It is important to realize, however,
that Sweden has provided yeoman service to the Western
defense for years by providing political and military
balance on the Northern flank that has greatly benefited
NATO, more sd than if Sweden were a member of the Alliance.
Without this contribution, NATO wouli be forced to shift
large forces, particularly air, for protection on the
Northern flank, an area already shown to be severely threat-
ened by Warsaw Pact forces. Beyond this indirect service,
Sweden's military intelligence organization is known to
cooperate with NATO; in a joint operation designed to eaves-
drop on the Soviets, Sweden and the Alliance used a
listening post built on the island of Lovoel, naar Stockholm
in 1982. [Ref. 12].
Swedish military doctrine is similar to that of NATO in
analyzing the threat, but while both Sweden and the Alliance
view the primary threat as coming from the east, Sweden's
attitude is somewhat different. The NATO view is that a
Soviet thrust from the Baltic across Sweden to reach Norway
is a real possibility. Sweden believes such an assault is
not very probable and that it is more likely that an attack
would be be launched along the southern coast of the Baltic
to seize Denmark and thus open up the Narrows, isolating
both Sweden and Norway. It is important to note that the
Swedish view holds such an attack as coming simultaneously
with a WTO assault on the Central Front.
An isolated national defense effort appears to be out as
a viable alternative for two reasons: either Sweden is
counting on Western assistance to counter any Soviet move,
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or else Sweden does not consider the Soviet threat to be
serious. The first case means that Sweden nas based her
military organization on the assumption that the Soviet
Union would initiate hostilities, and if so Sweden will meet
any advance with her own indigenous forces. The official
line is that the "total defense" concept will allow Sweden
to meet an assault without giving up too much territory.
But the Swedes also know that if no one comes to their aid,
the struggle would almost certainly end the same way as the
F.usso-Finnish Winter War of 1940, witn massive destruction
and eventual defeat with far-reaching ramifications.
On the other hand, if there is a reasonable chance of
getting assistance from NATO and the U.S., Sweden's position
becomes no worse than that of DenmarK. or Norway. In fact,
with her higher level of military preparedness, Sweden might
actually be better off than these two NATO members: able to
meet any attack with national forces, do what is possible
with available assets, and hope that allied assistance
arrives before too much territory is lost or destroyed. In
this regard, Sweden benefits from the NATO membership of
Norway and Denmark, for they indirectly contribute to
Swedish security by sheltering most of Sweden's land
borders, saving her from the significant expense of keeping
up a neutrality guard to the West, thereby allowing her to
concentrate her attention on the Baltic. [Ref. 13].
Traditionally, Swedish defense has been oriented against
an invasion from the sea and only secondarily from an inva-
sion by land in the far north. Ine present focus is on an
aggressor's move from the East, primarily across the Baltic
and secondarily across Finland. Sweden has decided to
strengthen her forces in Norrland, but the essential ques-
tion remains: how will she do it? It is important to
emphasize, however, that this strengthening is to be done
for political, not military, reasons. As Sweden views the
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present situation, Soviet forces on ttae Kola Peninsula pose
no real threat by land. They are too small ana not special-
ized enough to fight across Swedish Norrland.
The Soviet Union could provide reinforcements, but these
would be even less specialized for the weather and terrain,
lacking the proper hardware for cross-country light-
flotation or over-snow operations. Accordingly, the Swedes
do not fear this threat. In addition, the Scandinavian road
network is not conducive to a surprise attack by land
against Norway. An attack using only Northern Finland (the
Finnish Wedge) can only be supported by one road along
exceptionally difficult terrain. An attack through Sweden
provides more roads and the possibility of outflanking the
main Norwegian forces located near Tromso, but it also means
engaging Swedish forces and the added difficulty of crossing
numerous rivers. [Ref. 14].
The main Swedish fortifications are still oriented
toward an advance down the coast in the direction of
Stockholm. This approach has never been tactically sound
and in today's environment it is strategically unlikely. If
the Soviet Union were to launch a pre-emptive strike through
Sweden in order to protect the Kola bases, it would be
directed at enveloping the Tromso area and the NATO forces
there, not neutralizing the non-Alliance Swedes. [Ref. 15].
B. GROUND FORCE STRUCTURE
Swedish defense is based around four Norrland brigades,
organized as regular infantry brigades but with special
equipment and training for Norrland. Air Force interdiction
and fixed, heavy gun emplacements are to provide time for
the mobilization and deployment of the Norrland brigades and
subsequently for the brigades in central Sweden that might
be ordered north as reinforcements. In the Swedish view, as
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long as a Finnish buffer exists between her and the USSR,
there is no need for high-cost readiness or rapid reinforce-
ment measures.
As is always the Swedish case, the Air Force first
provides time for the other forces to mobilize and react to
an aggressor's moves, followed by fixed obstacles and forti-
fications. The Air Force is in-being, the mines are
partially in place, and the fortifications can be manned in
a matter of hours by the local population. The Norrland
brigades themselves can similarly be brought up to half-
strength in twelve hours by local mobilization. The
remaining officers and NCO's are air-lifted and the troops
transported by ground to numerous small depots (which are
characteristic of Swedish mobilization in general) in
Norrland. After initial mobilization, reinforcements could
only arrive after a long march with full equipment from
central Sweden.
It should be noted that the four Norrland brigades plus
associated forces amount to almost as sizeable a force as
the Soviets currently deploy in the North, as well as being
specialized for the mission at hand. If the USSR were to
deploy more forces, her efficiency--given known orders-of-
battle and tables of organization and equipment— would be
low. .Moreover, the Swedes consider it highly unlikely that
the Soviet Union would deploy more troops into the area
except under provocation. In conjunction with a Soviet main
attack against NATO, a secondary attack in Norrland would
seriously dissipate Soviet resources. On the other hand, an
attack in the North alone could be embarrassing, since the
USSR could not use mass to offset qualitative deficiencies
in this region. A faltering attack could seriously weaken
Soviet prestige at a critical point, providing her opponents
with the necessary evidence to strengthen their resolve.
[Pef. 5].
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The defense of North Sweden begins with the Air Force.
One Viggen fighter squadron is locate! at Lulea, and more
can be allocated to the many stand-by bases in the area
(developed after World War II when Sweden had the second
largest air force in Europe) . However, tha role of the
Viggen is primarily air defense and then reconnaissance.
Very few Viggen sorties would be allocated to ground attack,
and these probably only under special circumstances. Sweden
now only has 5.5 squadrons of at tacK- variant Viggens and
these are directed toward maritime defense. Instead, the
main brunt of ground support is to be born by the five light
attack squadrons (SK-60) in an interdiction role. It shouli
also be noted that the SK-60 is increasingly being
re-oriented from ground support to anti- helicopter defense,
since Sweden now recognizes that troop-carrying helicopters
add a new dimension to ground warfare, particularly in the
special conditions of the Far North. [Eef. 16].
Obstacles and fixed fortifications forii the next line of
resistance. These have been placed in belts, paralleling
the drainage lines on the coastal route to Stockholm. The
concept was that the belts would block any advance while the
Norrland units would counter-attack the extended flanks of
an attacker (a tactic borrowed from the Finns). While the
fortifications are still manned (the fixed costs have long
since been accounted for, and mobilization manpower is
cheap), this concept has largely been overtaksn by events.
Sweden now recognizes that belts are too easily penetrated
on the ground and too easily enveloped from the air by heli-
copter. But most important, tne fortifications have lost
their strategic value. Soviet thrusts would be toward the
West and Norway, not toward the South and Stockholm.
In order to adjust to this new strategic environment,
Sweden is shifting to British killing-zone tactics for the
beginning of any conflict and Finnish defense-in-depth
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tactics thereafter. This means that if her forces are rela-
tively strong against an attacker, Swedish territory will be
defended directly and the tactic will be to envelop the lead
elements in killing zones. It is believed that the marshy
terrain, bounded by many lakes and streams, will channel the
enemy along a sparse road network which allows few opportu-
nities for by-passing resistance. Thus a tank-oriented
attacker from the East will be easily trapped and destroyed
by firepower from the existing fixed f or tif ications.
[Ref. 17].
Only one-sixth of the Swedish tanK. inventory is allo-
cated to the North. Their initial use is defense against
airborne attack, after which they will be used to ring the
killing-zones. The turretless S-tank is designed as a tank-
destroyer, not as a conventional Main 3attle Tank (MET) .
If an attacker is able to proceed beyond the border
area, tactics will become more like those developed by the
Finns during the Russo-Finnish Far of. 1940. In this case,
if it appears the attacker is relatively strong, Swedish
forces would be dispersed and relatively little heavy fire
power would remain available for employment. On the other
hand, attacking forces would become increasingly over-
extended and vulnerable to flanking attacks—initially as
pinpricks against soft elements and later by an annihilating
counter-stroke with concentrated force elements. The
tactics are well suited to the forested and climatically
hostile terrain of Swedish territory.
While the defense of North Sweden has received dispro-
portionate attention because of its proximity to Kola, the
key to Swedish defense is far to the south. Thirty percent
of the Army and three of the four armored brigades are
located in Skane on the southern tip (Military Command
South), which makes up only 11 percent of the country and
contains 23 percent of the population. The area is close to
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the Continent, lies along the strategic Baltic Straits, and
lacks the heavy obstacles characteristic of Sweden as a
whole. In the area closest to, and most likely to be
invaded from, the Continent, excellent oeaches for amphib-
ious landing exist and the terrain just inland from them
comprises one of the few areas in Sweden truly suited to
armored warfare. [Ref. 4].
The primary tasks of Military Command South are
containing and destroying air and sea landings. Though not
officially admitted by the Army, apparently because of
interservice rivalry, an air landing is not feasible in the
face of Swedish air defenses, which would be difficult to
overcome due to range limitations of Soviet-designed fighter
aircraft. Thus an air landing must rely on small forces and
surprise; waiting until Swedish air defenses were worn down
would not work because airborne drops would then become
vulnerable to mobilized ground opposition and potential NATO
reinforcement.
C. THE ARMY'S DEFENSIVE STRATEGY
The Army's main mission is defense of the coastline in
conjunction with the Navy's coast artillery units. Fhile
the coast artillery concentrates on moving ship targets, the
Army provides static defense of the beaches and ports and
armored counter-attacks against any foothold achieved by the
enemy. Characteristic of Swedish tactics is that the armor
counter-attack means movement into position and attack by
fire. As in the British killing-zone concept, terrain is
recaptured an.d original positions restored only after the
enemy has been decimated by fire. Military Command South's
commitment is to counter-attack against dug-in enemy forces.
According to the old concept, the Army was to execute a
mobile defense, eventually destroying the invaier advancing
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northward through the open country of southern Sweden. The
killing-zone tactics, while not as fluid and effective as
the high-tempo tactics of the Germans, were consistent with
the S-tank and degree of training of the Swedish Army. A
mobilization army cannot readily execute German- style
armored tactics, but the extensive forests of Sweden serve
as a substitute for the individual training and discipline
normally needed for the British style of fighting. In the
new TR-80 tactical concept the armor will continue its role
of mobile defense and will be complemented by light infantry
using the extensive forests of the interior to mask any
movement, and to facilitate repetitive hit-and-run (Jager)
infantry attacks against the invader's flanks. However,
unlike the German concept of a counter-attack to annihilate
an over-extended attacker, the Swedish Army subscribes to
the idea of making an invader's costs greater than potential
benefits, and ironically of playing for time in order to
draw NATO attention and pressure to tne region in order to
cause the aggressor to withdraw. [fief. 5].
A final characteristic of Swedish tactics is that only
the Field Army proper moves throughout the country.
Territorial units--Home Guard and local defense companies
and battalions--defend regionally or in place and do not
withdraw with the Field Army. Coastal areas in general and
ports in particular thereby continue to be defended by local
units even if the Field Army withdraws. In this strategy,
ports play a key role; as long as the enemy is unable to
seize coastal ports, his force cannot be sustained and rein-
forced, thereby preventing him from mounting a major offen-
sive. In the Baltic, the sea is shallow and often becomes
too choppy to support amphibious landings across the beach.
In addition, beach landings are particularly vulnerable to
naval attack. Senior Swedish naval officers calculate that
from November to March, the overcast is such that naval
units can attack without the benefit of air cover.
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With present budgets, Sweden can no longer retain both
an army structure capable of defending the country alone
after mobilization, and high technology air and naval
services capable of preventing all but small-szale air and
sea landings. Unfortunately, the defense debate in Sweden
has become either/or. The Army, in an effort to increase
its own share of a decreasing moierniza tion and operating
budget, has framed the debate in terms of territorial
defense. But such an army cannot mobilize without the
warning and covering time provided by the air and naval
services. Nor could the Air Force and Navy ba sustained in
their current form over the long term without the continua-
tion of universal conscription, whose product only the Army
is large enough to absorb. The Army publicly conjures an
image of a populist territorial defense, while in reality
pursuing the substantive program of a costly field army,
replete with the latest tanks, armored infantry carriers,
air defense and other trappings of modern armies everywhere.
[Ref. 18].
A true territorial defense does not require the program
and costs of a field army. Fhile there are different forms
of territorial defense (the Yugoslav and Romanian examples
come to mind) , all are based on the concept of occupying
space with large numbers of lightly armed, locally mobilized
citizenry. The differentiating element is the role and size
of the central reserve, usually armor. The main body does
not require complex and expensive equipment, nor is lengthy
training required for conscripts. The forested Swedish
countryside is a natural mask for hit-and-run raids, except
in the area of Skane. Airborne landings are always vulner-
able to any form of organized resistance, while amphibious
landings are only a serious threat in Skane, since few good
beaches exist outside the region. Any landings that do
occur are likely to be cut off from reinforcement by the Air
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Force and Navy. in the Swedish case for territorial defense
the expensive armored reserve requirement is not large, and
it is already in being. Since the Swedish tactic is
counter-attack by fire, no large-scale sweeps with large
elements are needed. For this style, a tank destroyer
rather than a true tank is required; the S-tank should
suffice for many years. Nor is a sophisticated armored
infantry fighting vehicle required, for what is needed is a
form of armored taxi. In short, for true territorial
defense, the Swedish Army is already amply equipped and may
have to give up some of its heavy equipment.
The leadership of the Swedish Army has advocated terri-
torial defense, but it has done so with another intention in
mind. Still, territorial defense for the Army_ makes good
sense. It would, in essence, only remove a redundancy in
the present Swedish defense scheme, allowing modernization,
operating and conscription time-in-service funding to be
shifted from the Army to the air and naval forces. In this
way, Sweden could continue her present highly advantageous
strategy of projection in the region, while losing only a
field army capability— which she does not neei based on her
current tactics. its loss would not appreciably affect
Swedish defense capability, since in many ways it is nothing
more than a hold-over from an earlier period.
In purely military terms for the defense of Sweden
herself, a fully-funded army-based strategy may be more
effective than the present air and naval defense strategies,
but would not necessarily be cheaper for there could be
hidden costs (such as reduction in research and development
of high-technology areas for future industrial growth). And
there would be the unavoidable burden of accepting combat
in, and occupation of, Swedish territory. More important
for Sweden, however, are the strategic ani political aspects
of the choice. The Army, while improving its tactics and
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technical proficiency, is proceeding in a strategic
political- military void. Its new tactics are demanding and
impressive, hut they are being advocated in an overall envi-
ronment of reduced warning and post-mobilization shake-down
time as a result of the reduction in size of both the Air
Force and Navy. Even more important, the Army's strategy,
developed as it is from a recognition of greater Soviet
capabilities, implies an ultimate and inevitable reliance on
NATO. Further reliance on the Army, at the expense of the
other services, means a shift toward dependence on others
should deterrence fail.
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III. SWEDISH DEFENSE POLICY: THE NAVI AND AIR FORCE
A. THE CONCEPT OF NAVAL DEFENSE
In the overall scheme of Swedish defense, the Air Force
assumes the first line, the Navy the coastal line, and the
Army the defense of the coast and the interior. In the
present policy, it is the small (in personnel) but
equipment-sufficient air and navai services that are crit-
ical. Sweden fully expects any invasion to be stopped at
sea, therefore the Army is seen as insurance should an enemy
succeed in lodging a force in Sweden proper. In this scheme
it is not the role of the Air Force and Navy to sink or
destroy the opposing force. Instead they have the less
demanding task of aborting any invasion.
According to Sweden, any war will be short, thereby
precluding repair of battle- damaged equipment. As a result
she will be faced with secondary forces not required else-
where. For this reason, in a major departure from normal
military practice and policy, the Swedish military sees its
role as the incapacitation rather than the destruction of
enemy forces. In doing so, the defense problem has been
greatly simplified.
Swedish defense is centered around the timely emplace-
ment and protection of elaborate minefields. Once the mine-
fields are in place (many are simply activated), the country
is effectively shielded and Army mobilization and deployment
is secured. Attack submarines and Viggens help attain the
time for mine emplacement, and it is important to note that
the small-boat navy and coastal artillery (organic to the
Navy) orient themselves around the minefields. [Ref. 5 ]-
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In the Swedish plan, enemy warships are not the prime
targets. Father the two primary targets are relatively
soft: the specialized mine-ciearinj ship and the troop
transport. Enemy warships are to be avoided, but if
attacked the aim is to disable the shif by attacking the
bridge and superstructure areas- Tnis accomplishes the
mission while reducing the size of the weapon required, in
effect indirectly enhancing the attack vehicle's payload.
At the same time, even a reduced-warhead weapon can sink the
primary mine-clearing and troop-carrying ships.
While the Viggen is the glamorous arm of Swedish
defense, the workhorse is the small boat navy sheltered
along the coast. These boats force the enemy naval escorts
into forward positions to protect their mine-clearing
efforts. But in doing so, unless a large fleet is present,
the remaining invasion force is uncovered, thus providing a
less defended target for the Viggens and an opportunity for
a guick strike by other boats masked by the coastal islands
and awaiting a suitable opportunity.
This mutually reinforcing air and naval scheme effec-
tively protects the island-dotted coast from the Aland
Islands to Karlskrona and the west coast of Goteborg. The
open west coast along the Kattegat at this time is not a
major threat area (Sweden in this case relies on NATO to
provide adequate protection), while the coastline of the
Gulf of Bothnia is normally protected by closing off the
Gulf at the Alands by minefields [Ref. 15].
According to Admiral Rudberg, the primary problem for
the Swedish Defence Forces, particularly the Navy, is
providing adequate surveillance along the coast, a problem
compounded by the extension of territorial waters from 3
nautical miles to 12 [Ref. 19]. The length of Sweden's
coastline on the Baltic is 1601 kilometers (960 miles), and
in the west, from Skane to the Norwegian border, 400
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kilometers (240 miles). Not only is this a long coastline
for a small force to cover, but geographically it is a
difficult ore to guard, for over much of its length it is in
the form of an archipelago with hundreds of islands. The
water varies in depth from a few meters to over 60 meters in
some places. Furthermore, the factors affecting sound
propagation in water and a sea-bed of varying conditions
create an extremely difficult situation for effective anti-
submarine warfare {ASV) operations. However, through
careful planning, this has been turned to Sweden's advantage
to create a defense in depth. But if the defenses are
breached or covert intruders escape initial detection as as
happened in four major incidents in the last three years
[Ref. 20], then there are inumerable places ia which small
hostile forces can hide or through which they can effect
escape.
The Swedish Naval Forces comprise two arms—the Navy and
the Coast Artillery--which conduct operations in close coop-
eration. The Navy provides four major elements in the mari-
time defense strategy (light surface units, underwater
units, mine warfare units, and the naval air arm) while the
Coast Artillery provides both fixed and mobile units (See
Table I). With the emphasis on coastal operations within
the 12 nautical mile limit and bearing in mini the type of
natural environment in which the naval forces must operate,
and with the existing economic situation and escalating cost
of procuring military eguipment, the Navy has been reorgan-
ized around the powerful light coastal forces. This shift
away from larger forces of the cruiser and destroyer classes
occurred over the past decade, with the last cruiser being
retired in 1974 and the last destroyer being stricken in
1983 [Ref. 21]. The one element which the Navy has not
reduced is the submarine force, a force which continues to














































































































Swedish maritime defense strategy is based on the
Government's requirement of preventing an aggressor invading
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by sea from establishing himself on Swedish territory. To
this end the Swedish defensive system is designed to come
into operation as far from the Swedish coast as possible,
and is based on a series of strategic "barriers'* or defen-
sive lines. The outermost line consists of attack aircraft
of the Swedish Air Force and submarines of the Wavy.
As mentioned earlier, one of the primary objectives of
the Swedish Air Force is to delay an approaching invasion
force as long as possible in order to gain time for mobili-
zation and for the other defense forces to position them-
selves as the situation demands. Although the unofficial
comments regarding Sweden holding out for seven days and
then being supported by NATO were decried publicly, current
thinking within the military seems to anticipate that at the
most the Air Force would have to hold off a determined
onslaught for two weeks at the most [Kef. 22] by which
time it will probably have ceased to exist as a unified
fighting force, considering the projected intensity of any
future conflict.
Submarines in the outer barrier are normally armed with
wire-guided torpedoes, but they are also able to lay mines,
either in the face of an advancing attack or in waters in
proximity to the mainland to prevent an amphibious attack.
These highly sophisticated boats, designed for operations in
the difficult conditions of the Baltic, are capable of
remaining in any combat zone for periods in excess of 30
days
.
The second line of defense is based on the light
forces--the flotillas of Spica and Hugin- class Fast Attack
Craft (FAC's), armed with missiles, guns and torpedoes and
fully capable of laying mines if assigned this task. The
flexible nature of these light craft, and their relatively
simple logistics reguirements, means that they can be moved
from base to base around the Swedish coastline, or they can
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be operated from inlets and bays within the fjords without
major organizational support. Ihey can also be rapidly
deployed to different areas, depending on how the threat
develops.
Closer to the coastline is the third line of defense,
the minesweeping units needed to keep shipping lanes and
ports clear, and the ASW units principally assigned to work
with the two shore-based helicopter sguadrons operated by
the Navy.
The final defense barrier consists of the stationary and
mobile batteries and permanent inshore minefields of the
Coast Artillery. These units are assigned to areas of stra-
tegic importance with the guns heavily protected.
Stationary batteries are heavily armored and have deep
underground shafts providing crew shelter and accommodation,
as well as aamunition storage sufficiently secure to with-
stand a near miss from nuclear warhead [Ref. 20]. Tne
mobile units provide a flexible ba~k-up which can be rapidly
deployed to meet a developing threat and to create a reserve
in possible invasion areas. The minefields are remotel-y
controlled from shore bases manned by the Coast Artillery.
All these units are supported by well-eguipped and
protected bases spread around the coast. They are capable
of providing full support for the replenishment and repair
of unit, and in the case of some of the larger bases have
shipyard and shelter facilities deep underground which have
been blasted out of rock. These facilities, however, are
not projected to see much utilization, as the intensity and




The Swedish Navy today consists almost entirely of
FAC's, patrol craft and submarines (see Table I) . Sweden's
last cruiser, the Gota Lejon ("Lion of Goth") , was built in
1945 and was the first cruiser in the world armad with fully
automatic six-inch guns. Modernized in 1964, she was sold
to Chile in 1972 at the time the current defense policy was
being formulated. [ Eef . 21] The last operational destroyer,
the Halland, which completed a world training cruise in late
1982, was laid up in 1983, and future training will be
conducted aboard the newly commissioned minelayer
Carlskrona. The main strength of the surface attack force
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boats are armed with a Bofors SAK 57mm gun and six torpedo
tubes designed to fire to the Swedish type-6 1 torpedo. With
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only minor codification they can be adapted to the mine-
laying role.
Sweden's fast attack flotillas are currently undergoing
major modernization and a modest program of expansion.
While the guality of the weapons systems and other equipment
of the Navy is good, they are not available in sufficient
numbers. If Sweden is to gain the maximum advantage from
the new weapons systems and electronics now un ier develop-
ment, then more hulls must be made available on which to
mount the equipment and allow the Navy the flexibility it
needs to counter a sudden threat developing ftrom an unex-
pected quarter, or simultaneous threats from various
directions. [Hef. 23],
The Social Democratic Government, with the support of
the other main parties (liberal, Centre and two minority
parties) is determined to implement the modernization and
missile-arming of the 12 Norrkopping -class FAC's while the
six boats of the Spica -class will be phased out of service
by 1990 without being modernized.
The modernization of the Norrkopping -class is being
carried out by the Karlskronavar vet yard, an area which has
increasingly become the subject of covert intrusions by
foreign submarines in recent years. This modernization
involves completely refitting all the fire control and
combat information center (CIC) equipment, mounting four
twin-box launchers for the new Saab-Bofors RSS 15 anti-ship
missile in place of the after four torpedo tubes (the new
forward tubes will be retained) , mounting the new Ericsson
SEA GIRAFrE radar and a new advanced electronic countermea-
sure (ECM) unit, the Saab-Sciana Ew'S 905. In addition, the
boats will each receive a new air-intercept system for
tracking hostile aircraft and missiles. Although these
modernized boats will provide the Swedish Navy with a
significant increase in fire-power, there are no current
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plans to update the gun system with the same 57mm gun on the
Spica -class boats [ Bef . 23]. The Swedes may he forced to
look back ruefully at having had the opportunity to give the
Norrkoppings a completely new lease on life and having
thrown it away. At any rate, the modernization program is
scheduled for completion in late 1985.
In June 1982, the Navy placed orders with
Karlskronavarvet for the first two FAC's of the new
Stockholm -class. This new generation of boats will differ
in a number of ways from the existing Spica -types, the most
notable difference beinj a significant A5W capability.
Following the numerous incidents involving foreign subma-
rines entering Swedish territorial waters, particularly the
famous Q— 1 37 incident of October 1981 and the detection of a
submarine in the naval base area of Musko in October 1932,
urgent steps are being taken to improve Swedish AS3 capa-
bility. ASW equipment will be manufactured in Sweden under
foreign licenses from Canada and France, including a
variable-depth sonar (VDS) . Armament of the Stockholm- class
will include the Bofors SAK 57ma Mk 2 gun, eight RES 15
surface-to-surface missiles, and two torpedo tubes carrying
wire-guided torpedoes. A 40mm gun will be mounted aft, and
electronics will include the SEA GIEAFFE radar, fire-control
and air-intercept radars, and a Swedish designed and built
communications system.
Propulsion for these craft will be provided by both
diesel and gas-turbine systems, although the systems chosen
will only give the boats a maximum speed of 30 knots as
opposed to the 40 knots of the Norrkopping -class. This
reduction in speed, which results in lower fuel consumption,
reduced maintenance, and longer engine life is considered to
be acceptable because of the range (in excess of 60 miles)
of the RBS 15 missile, its effectiveness in a heavy elec-
tronics warfare environment (projected for the Baltic in any
42
conflict), and the extended ranee of the 57mm gun with the
latest modifications in available ammunition.
Only two boats of the Stockholm- class have been
ordered. It has not been decided by the Ministry of Defence
whether the boats will be built as a series oc not. Some
doubt exists because of the proposal for a new boat, the
Missile Boat 90 (to be known as the Gothenburg- class) . The
design for the class has not been confirmed, although it
could possibly be the same as the Stockhoims (a series)
,
slightly larger, or it could be a completely new design.
The choice will hinge on the decision concerning the Navy's
future ASW capability, [Ref. 24], for it seems to be a waste
of a Fast Attack Craft's best assets to assign it to an ASH
role, for ASW demands capabilities contrary to those around
which the FAC is developed (i.e. its high speed and heavy
anti-surface vessel fire power) .
Finally in the surface unit field Karlskr onavar vet is
modernizing the eight coastal patrol- craft of the 701-
class. The hulls of these old gasoline-engine torpedo boats
were surveyed and found feo be in good condition and as a
result the decision was made to keep them in the naval
inventory for economic reasons, assigning them as patrol
craft in the archipelago region.
C. SUBSURFACE ONITS
Cne of the most vital elements of the Royal Swedish Navy
is that provided by the submarine service, and in the fore-
seeable future there is no possibility of their being with-
drawn from service. Swedish submarine technology is
considered to be some of the best in the world, and the
Swedish-built boats are specifically designed to operate in







































The latest boats to enter service are three submarines
of the Nacken -class, commissioned between 1979 and 1981.
These three are amor.g the most modern and sophisticated
diesel-electric boats in the world. With a highly automated
computer system designed to provide tactical data and data
on the two main propulsion systems, the Nackens operate with
significantly reduced manpower--5 officers and 14 ratings.
Improved construction methods, combined witn an optimum
hydrodynamic shape, has resulted in a reduction in size to
980 tons.
The main armament is the torpedo, but unlike most other
submarines, two different types are carried. Six standard
tubes are built into the bow, each of which carries and
fires the FFV type-6 1 torpedo. In addition, there are two
smaller tubes in the bow designed to use the FFV type-42
torpedo. By carrying different torpedo loads the submarines
can vary attack procedures and weapon response depending on
the type of target and whether it is a surface or
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sub-surface target. As an alternative to the type-6 1 torpe-
does, the boats can also carry mines. It is worth noting
that in this configuration, with their two distinct torpedo
systems, the submarines can carry the maximum number of
mines and at the same time still remain capable of self-
defense or conducting torpedo attacks as the occasion
de m a n d s
.
The Nackens are highly maneuverable with six control
surfaces. Two depth control hydroplanes are mounted on the
sail as in nuclear-powered submarines, while depth and
lateral attitude are further controlled from after planes
set in a unicue "X" configuration. Such a configuration was
first adopted in the Sjoormen- class to enable the boats to
rest more easily on the sea-bed, without f^ar of rolling
over or damaging the hydroplanes as might be the case if
they were set in the more traditional vertica 1- horizontal
position. [Ref. 19].
At the beginning of 1982 the Royal Swedish Navy placed
an order with the Kockums firm for a new class of submarine.
Beferred to as the A 17, these four submarines will be known
as the Vastergotland- class. They are due to be delivered
between early 1987 and the end of 1989. Work on the boats
will be divided between the Kockums yard and
Karlskronavarvet , the latter yard building the bow and stern
sections of the boats which will then be transported to
Kockums where they will be welded on to the middle section.
The same construction technique will be used as in the
Nacken- class, each of the sections being almost completely
fitted out before they are welded together. This system of
construction, together with the placing of the fully
completed boat in the water by the largest cranes at
Kockums, will result in considerable cost reduction, as it
did with the Nackens, while at the same time providing more
job security for the workers in two of Sweden's most impor-
tant naval repair facilities.
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The design of the A17 is base! on the experience gainel
with the Nacken- class. As a result the A17 will provide
more internal space for the crew than in the previous class
while at the same time achieving improved performance and
generally proving more efficient. The major aim has been to
reduce the manning requirements to an absolute minimum.
This has been accomplished and the A17 design has probably
reached the ultimate limit in manpower requirements with
regard to safety. This reduction is being achieved, as in
the Nackens, by usin^ a Saab-Scania 1-man console for
controlling the submarine's movement: steering, alterations
in depth-keeping, engine rpm alterations, tank trimming,
etc. The total control system is fully automated, the A17
being a follow-on to the use of microcomputers and modern
electronics in the Nacken- class boats.
Underwater performance has been improved by using a
different battery configuration to improve the energy
capacity. The hydrodynamic design of the hull is considered
to be the best that can be obtained for a conventional
submarine with a requirement for a very small tactical diam-
eter (turning radius) and the need to achieve rapid changes
in depth attitude. The after control "X"-conf iguration is
unique to Swedish submarines (although the Royal Netherlands
Navy will use the same configuration on their future classes
of submarines) . Both pairs of hydrophones are mechanically
independant and the boats will be highly maneuverable
throughout their complete diving depth.
To reduce the risk of detection, the Vastergotland-
class will use new hull materials as well as becoming more
independant of the surface. Kockums have been carefully
studying different methods of propulsion, but so far no
other system has proved to be reliable enough to meet the
specifications required. Therefore the die sel-electric
system with battery back-up will remain the preferred system
for the near future, at least. [Ref. 25].
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With such a wealth of submarine experience behind them,
Kockums have developed three basic submarines for export,
based on the designs developed to meet the specific require-
ments of the Swedish Navy in the Baltic. The Type 45 was
the first effort at developing an export submarine (with the
approval of the Government) , and this submarine is being
examined by the Indian Navy. The Type 46 is more similar to
recent designs and the Type 47 is very similar to the
British Oberon- class. All the boats for export are shock-
tested by Kockums, and the yard carries out all sea-trials
for the Navy, with a Swedish Navy crew assigned. Future
efforts at building boats for export are considered to be a
primary means of reducing the overall cost of boats for the
Swedish Navy, while at the same time significantly helping
reduce the current overseas trade deficit [fief. 26],
D. HINE WARFARE
Mine warfare has always played a major role in Sweden's
defenses. In this regard Sweden uses all three major types
of mine: moored, ground influence and floating mines. Tney
are activated in a variety of ways and minefields are of two
basic types—controlled and uncontrolled.
The political parties have all emphasized the need for a
capacity to take rapid action in laying mines [Ref- 17].
Since the Second World War it has been Swedish policy that
every warship have the capability to lay mines. In addi-
tion, the Navy has three large minela/ers (See Table IV) the
4iZ§k°£iI' Ii§^2£9./ axi(^ the Carlskrona the last of which was
commissioned in 1982. This powerful ainelaying capability
is backed by number of merchant vessels such as ferries,
which in time of crisis can be requisitioned and rapidly
converted to a minelaying role, as they are already trained



























































three large ships are also used as training ships and subma-
rine tenders.
The Carlsfcrona is the largest vessel ordered for the
Swedish Navy since the cruisers laid down in the 1940's.
Built by Karlskronavarvet, the double-bottom hulled mine-
layer is subdivided between the tank top and mine deck by
watertight bulkheads / for a total of 14 watertight compart-
ments. The laying of an accurate minefield requires very
precise navigation and maneuvering capabilities . For this
the Carlskrona is fitted with twin rudders controlled by
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twin electro-hydraulic steering gear and a tunnel-type bow
thruster unit. The propulsion machinery is arranged in two
engine rooms, with control and monitoring ecuipraent central-
ized in a single control room located in the forward engine
room. Each engine room houses two Nohab F212-D825 12
cylinder diesel engines and associate! gearbox, with each
engine room providing power to an individual shaft.
The fire control system or. Carlskrona has been designed
not only for control of the two Bofors 57mm and two Bofors
UOmm gun mounts, but also to provide a peacetime training
facility which very closely approximates the systems on the
Hugin and modernized Horrkopping- class FAC's. For this
purpose the ship carries two Philips 9LV 200 radar and
optronic systems which can be operated inlependantly to
provide a basic FAC type control system, or combined as a
single system to provide the full capability for the more
advanced and modernized boats. [ Ref . 23].
Although Sweden can be considered to be advanced in Loth
her mine laying capability and her stocks of mines, the same
cannot be sail of her mine-countermeasure (MCI) force. This
is not because HCM units have not been considered to be
important, but rather because of lack of the financial
resources necessary to develop such a force. 3y the end of
the 1970's Sweden's MCM force had reached a state in the
face of modern mine technology where it became vital to
modernize the force, if it was to remain effective ani
ensure mine-free shipping routes and ports. At the begin-
ning of 1981 funds were male available for the tfavy to order
the first two ships of a new minehunter class, the Landsort
-class (see table IV). A total of six MCtf's are planned,
and the first of the class, the Landsort is expected to
become operational by the end of this year, with the second
ship operational shortly thereafter. The other four ships
of the class were provided for in plans developed in 1982,
but to date they have not been ordered.
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The Landsorts are diesel powered and designed for
unmanned running, equipped for semi-auto ma tic maneuvering (a
system to be improved in the future when hovering and track
managemenl i.ecomo computerized and linked to the navigation
computer). The fully integrated navigation and AIO systems
being developed for the class are a joint development
between Swedish and British electronics firms, while the
detection and classification sonar selected is manufacture!
in France. For mine disposal, the Landsorts are equipped
with two remote controlled SEA a L vehicles built by
Kockums. Normal sweeping equipment includes mecnanicai
iw^» ps for moored mines and magnetic and acoustic sweeps for
influence mines. In addition, the Landsort can act as the
control ship for three remote controlled catamaran mine-
sweeps which are being built by Karlskronavar vet and
designed for inshore use.
The catamaran sweeps, designated SAM, are self-propelled
15-ton units fitted with a complete computer program to
ai.low the vehicle to simulate the magnetic and acoustic
signatures of different type ships. With a "foam sandwich"
hull and open deck, the vehicles can detonate mines directly
beneath them with the result that the explosions can exert
their effect through the hulls without any severe effect.
The first of these catamarans was delivered in November
1982 and is the first of five vehicles built for the Navy.
The Navy has an option on an additional 15, although
currently no orders have been placed. [ F.ef . 20].
E. MARITIME AIR
Although only a small branch of the Swedish Navy, the
Naval Air arm is, nevertheless, ona of the most important
for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact
that the Swedish Navy currently relies on its helicopters
for nearly all its ASW capability.
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The naval helicopter squadrons are under the command of
the various naval base commanders. Two types of helicopter
are currently in use: the large Vertol 107 HKP4 used for
ASW, mine clearance, radar surveillance, air-sea rescue and
transporting the Coast Artillery Rangers; and the
Augusta-Bell 206B HKP6 used exclusively for &SW and radar
surveillance.
The Navy operates two squadrons of helicopters, Number 1
and Number 2. Number 1 Squadron is stationed south of
Stockholm near the Berga Training Scaool and is responsible
for an operating area north of Stockholm along the coast and
out to the territorial limit. Number 2 Squadron is based at
Gothenburg and covers the southern coast of Sweden as well
as the area to the west.
Number 1 Squadron is equipped with six HKPU's, three of
which were purchased from the United States in 1S63 and
three which were built in 1973 under license from the
Kawasaki firm in Japan; and six HKP6's. Number 2 Squadron
is equipped with four of each type helicopter, with the
HKP^'s built under Kawasaki license. The aircraft are
equipped with the French-built Sintra Alcatel DUA V4 dipping
sonar, modified to meet Swedish requirements for maintaining
transducer attitude regardless of water currents. "he
system has been used by the Swedish Navy for about 5 years
with satisfactory results.
Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) and Electronic
Count ermeasures (ECM) are carried out with equipment
designed and built in Sweden, although there are plans to
procure the French Omera 0R3 32 HERACLES I-band radar for
self -protection and stand-off jamming capability. Attacks
on known hostile submarines are conducted using the FFV
Type-42 torpedo, of which each helicopter carries four. The
aircraft are also capable of carrying mines or depth
charges.
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The HKPU is also equipped with three MARLIN AS W devices.
These are thrown overboard by hand, tut can only be deployed
when the exact location of a submerged submarine is known.
The MAF.1IN is a small device fitted with a powerful trans-
mitter and a strong magnet, designed to attach itself to the
hull of the submarine and transmit a coded signal. The
helicopter uses its dipping sonar in the passive mode to
listen for the MAR1IN transmissions which the give the crew
the bearing of the submarine. Using the normal operating
procedure of deploying a pair of helicopters, it becomes
possible to pinpoint the location of tne evading boat. The
MARLIN is primarily intended for peacetime use against
submarines which refuse to identify themselves and prove to
be evasive. [ Ref . 15],
Peacetime manpower requirements of the two squadrons are
set at 200 and 150 respectively, but the squadrons are
organized into different departments depending on the
mission. Training is carried out by Numoer 2 Squadron, and
pilots receive their initial training in French Alouette II
helicopters before progressing to the HKP6. Prior to heli-
copter training naval pilots undergo 60 hours of fixed-wing
aircraft training with the Swedish Air Force after having
completed a general naval training period as a naval officer
for a period of six to sever years. The time from basic
training until a pilot becomes fully qualified takes about
five years. After qualification in the HKP6, pilots advance
to the HKP4. [Ref. 19].
Number 1 Squadron is tasked as a fully operational front
line squadron in which all pilots are fully qualified to fly
either type of aircraft. Before joining the squadron, all
flying members are completely trained in the various aspects
of ASW.
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F. THE FUTURE OF THE. NAVY
ASF is one of the few areas in which the Swedish Navy
acknowledges it has deficiencies. The problem was high-
lighted in October of 1982 when the Swedish Navy was unable
to keep track of the intruder which penetrated the archipe-
lago as far as the Berga training school. Admittedly the
sonar conditions at the time were very poor, for the weather
had been very warm and calm, the surface of the water was
calm, and at depth the water temperature was very low.
Furthermore, the salinity in the area varies considerably
and the bottom is rocky and uneven. All these problems
posed considerable problems for the helicopter crews, tut
they are the same problems they will face in times of actual
combat. As a result, the Swedish Navy has identified many
of the areas in which it needs to concentrate its efforts
toward improving its ASW capability. It will continue to
rely on the helicopters as the mainstay of the ASF force,
but these will be augmented by surface VDS-equipped FACs of
the Stockholm -class. [Ref. 24]. This is not an ideal
solution to the problem, but the Navy cannot afford a
single-role, dedicated ASW vessel, and for the time being
the only surface units that will be available for such a
role will be the multi-role FACs.
Another area identified as requiring improvements is the
helicopter squadrons themselves. To achieve maximum capable
efficiency, the squadrons require an increase in manpower,
but this is not possible because of current economic
constraints. A further problem lies in the limit placed on
overtime pay (200 hours is the maximum) by the Defense
Union. Any increase in the agreed number of working hours
has to be the subject of negotiations. No time-off
in-lieu-of pay is authorized for extra hours worked, and
cash-payment has to be accep ted--which is subject to a taxa-
tion rate of 70 percent.
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A final area requiring special attention is the torpedo
and anti-submarine branch. Much attention must be paid to
this area through a higher standard of training and the
implementation of better courses of instruction. It would
also be to the advantage of the Navy if it was able to send
its ASW officers abroad, but the JJavy is currently provided
only a small budget for sending officers to other countries,
and this amount has to be spread over the whole spectrum of
naval defenses. However, there is a strong possibility that
this budget will be increased in light of the continuing
incursions by foreign submarines in Swedish waters. If
Sweden is to improve its ASW forces, particularly in opera-
tional and tactical expertise, it is essential that ASW
exchanges with other navies which possess high-quality ASW
forces be increased.
G. THE SWEDISH AIR FORCE
At the en3 of World War Two, Sweden possessed the second
largest air force in Europe (behind the United Kingdom) , and
since that time the country has attempted to maintain a
strong and balanced defense, although rising costs have
forced cutbacks in some areas. Even so, the air arm remains
in the aggregate larger than that of Great Britain or
France. [Ref. 21] With a "people- to-plane ratio" of about
25:1, Sweden ranks with Israel ahead of other nations in
maintaining a first line, combat ready air force with a
minimum number of people.
Combat aircraft, designed and built by Sweden's own
aerospace industry, rank among the world's most advanced
designs, both in aerodynamics and in "black box" capability.
But behind that sophistication is a functional design
philosophy that gives Sweden even more "equivalent aircraft"
than its current fighter and attack squadrons indicate--high
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sortie rates and a heavy flying hour program come from guick
turn- around times and a hard-nosel design emphasis on ease
of maintenance.
Swedish planes are flown with about one-half the
"people-to-plane ratio" of the U.S. Tactical Air Command.
In terms of combat aircraft to total people, Sweden's air
force is four times leaner than France's or Wast Germany's.
With personnel costs absorbing more than half of many coun-
tries' defense budgets, the efficiency of the Swedish Air
Force stands out. But the one characteristic of the Air
Force which stands out from the rast is its iaadly serious
and pragmatic approach to combat readiness. As the head of.
the Supreme Command's Press Department put it, "The Swedes
have decided that their aircraft will not maet the same
destiny as Egypt's in the Six Day War." [ Eef . 21].
In connection with the portion of Swedish defense policy
which states that an isolated attack against Sweden is
unlikely, the concept of marginal attacking forces is
particularly important. Since, according to the Swedish
scenario, an invader will only be able to task such forces
against Sweden as can be spared from other operations,
Sweden will not have to prepare to meet the full might of a
power such as the Soviet Union, only the marginal forces
left over after the Soviet's other military priorities have
been met. This factor, combined witn the defense-favorable
factors of Swedish geographical characteristics, lends cred-
ibility to Sweden's defense efforts and particularly the
role of the Swedish Air Force. [Ref. 22].
Successive Swedish governments have spent approximately
similar proportions of the GNP on defense, averaging about
three percent per year. Rising costs have forced cutbacks
in some defense areas, notably large naval vessels as
recounted above. But today Swedish defense forces are char-
acterized by a large professional Air Force which has in its
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inventory 421 combat aircraft, most of .which are kept in
full operational condition. A small portion of the Air
Force's assets are mothballed, in anticipation of some
future mobilization.
In addition to being quantitatively well equipped, the
Air Force is equipped with very high-quality equipment,
resulting largely from efforts to maintain an independent
arms industry. While politically important for the credi-
bility of Swedish neutrality, this has also permitted Sweden
to manufacture arras specifically designed for Sweden's
geographical climate and the current military doctrine and
manpower limitations. This has allowed Sweden to take full
advantage of its resources and to develop a viable military
approach to the defense question. [Ref. 5].
While Sweden does not represent a primary target in the
event of an all-out East-West war, the country does consti-
tute an important potential transit route, especially for
aircraft. Additionally, ground forces and cruise missiles
of both sides can be expected to use Swedish territory in an
effort to reduce the time and distance needed to engage the
enemy. The capture and use of Swedish airfields would also
be an important asset for the Soviet Jnion in wartime, for
in the absence of Soviet carrier-based aircraft (until the
mil-1990's) this would extend Soviet air coverage over the
Norwegian Sea. [Ref- 14].
The primary means of countering such threats is the
Swedish Air Force, and in this regard it serves a dual
purpose. One one hand its 216 intercepters aircraft
(composed of 180 J-35 Drakens and 36 JA-37 fighter-variant
Viggens) provide the ability to prevent transit of Swedish
airspace. In this respect it is important to note that,
according to defense officials, the LM Ericsson pulse-
doppler radar and British Aerospace Skyflash missiles of the
newer Viggens (of which 113 further aircraft are on order)
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provide the look-down/shoot-down capability for acquiring
and destroying low-flying cruise missiles [Ref. 1 ].
On the other hand, the Air Force provides a powerful
anti-invasion force. "he 97 FGA AJ-37 ground-attack Viggens
are highly sophisticated weapons platforms, capable of all-
weather operations against ground and sea targets. This
forces an invader to choose between forgoing the element of
surprise by first attempting to destroy the Swedish Air
Force (thus providing the time required for general Swedish
mobilization) , or else mounting a direct invasion without
preparatory attacks, with the liKelihood of sustaining high
losses during a Baltic transit.
"he Swedish Air Force provides a good illustration of
the mix of tactical doctrine which applies to all the
Swedish armed forces— carefully thougnt-out, domestically
produced systems and non-professional, mobilizeable defense
structure built around a nucleus of professionals for the
tasks requiring a high degree of technical skill and
specialization. A good example is the highly mobile,
dispersed Swedish wartime aircraft-basing system which is
exercised annually during major war-games. In the event of
attack, each Swedish combat-aircraft division (18 aircraft)
disperses to a number of secondary airstrips, most of which
consist of specially built segments of the civilian road
network. These are too numerous for an enemy to be able to
destroy them all, and at the same time they avoid a large
concentration of aircraft at any one base. Finally, the
road strips themselves are extremely difficult for an enemy
to locate.
The concept of the strips is that ground service vehi-
cles can be hidden in the woods nearby, until an aircraft
touches down. Then the ground crew of 15 mobilized
personnel, under the supervision of one professional air
force technician, carry out a complete check of the
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aircraft, refuel and rearm it, and oversee a pilot change.
~ha entire process takes less than 12 minutes, and in less
than twenty minutes from the rnoaent of touch-down, the
aircraft can be airborne— ready for another sortie. The
ground vehicles and crews disappear into the forest, either
to wait for another aircraft or to move to another prepared
runway strip. [Ref. 1],
This basing system is remarkable for several reasons.
First, it means that Swedish Air Force fighters can carry
out between two and three times the number of sorties in the
time it takes another air force to carry out one and prepare
the aircraft for the next one. Second, it means that
Swedish Air Force ground support and runway facilities are
difficult, if not impossible, to neutralize. Third, apart
from the supervisor, all ground crew personnel are mobilized
reservists who have only a few days to relearn the skills
they acquire in basic training.
All this reflects the thoughtf ulness with which Swedish
technology has been applied to the military. The present
basing system is the result of between 15 and 20 years of
research and development in this field, seeking not only
maximum aircraft mission capability for Swedish combat
aircraft, but also easy maintenance and aircraft turn-around
by non-professional ground crews. [Ref. 27].
In addition to the development of training and support
doctrine and procedures, the Air Force nas spent consider-
able time on the development of special tactics ideally
suited to the capabilities of the /iggens. As important as
these aircraft are to Swedish defense, the loss of any
number of them would be a serious problem for the defense
establishment. In addition, with the continued rise in
defense costs in the minds of defense planners, expending
air-to-air missiles unnecessarily must be avoided.
Accordingly, a tactic called the "Swing S," designed
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specifically for use against Soviet or Warsaw Pact MiG
aircraft, has been developed. In this maneuver, the Swedish
pilot draws the Soviet pilot into air-to-air combat at close
range. Knowing the limitations of the Soviet-built
aircraft's capabilities, particularly regarding the raaar
and weapons systems, the Swedish pilot rapidly maneuvers to
prevent the enemy from gaining a position to his rear, for
Soviet tactics most often reflect the use of the heat-
seeking missiles which must be fired from the r ear-quadrant
in order to be effective. Once the Soviet is locked in
combat, he is drawn to an altitude of less than 1000 meters,
at which time the Swede makes a rapid dive directly toward
the ground, hoping to get the enemy to attempt to follow
him. With the superior handling capability of the Viggen,
the aircraft is able to be pulled from the dive at the last
minute, enabling the Swedish aircraft to escape; the MiG,
less maneuverable at high speed and low altitude, is forced
into the ground. Demonstrations of this maneuver to
American pilots familiar with the American F-18 fighter have
been most impressive, and NATO tacticians believe it will
work, primarily because of the design of the Viggen with its
small forward wing. [Eef. 27].
The Swedish Air Force is the first line of defense, with
doctrine, tactics and material designed to fulfill that
role. The quality of available equipment is state-of-the-
art with training of the professional nucleus commensurate
with the importance Sweden places on this branch of the
service. Fhile other services have suffered from the
economic conditions of the past decade, the Air Force has
.maintained its position at the top of the defense hierarchy.
With the recent and continuing Soviet incursions into
Swedish territorial waters, there is no reason to assume
that the Air Force's role will change in the near future.
59
IV. SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY FOE THE 1980^S: THE SILENT
PARTNER?
During the 1970's there was a broad domastic: political
consensus to keep Swedish defense spending at 3. 5% of GNP.
Since the defense establishment had been built up during the
1950*5 and 1960's, when 5% of GNP was devoted to defense, it
was possible to maintain the same force structure. While
the Air Force and Navy modernize! their services through
reduction in size, the Army kept its force of almost 30
field brigades. The need to place all conscripts in the
wartime organization kept the numbers high, but the Army had
to compromise on training and weapons. In the choice
between an introvert, army-oriented strategy and an extro-
vert, navy and air force strategy, the Army prevailed at
first for political and ideological reasons. Toward the end
of the decade, this trend was reversed as Sweden decided to
develop a new combat aircraft, modernize the Navy's anti-
submarine warfare capability, and improve the mobility and
alertness of its field forces. Behind this reversal in
policy was the end of detente in Europe and the increased
interest and capabilities of the superpowers in Northern
Europe. Swedish defense policy moved toward a more European
security oriented posture.
A. CHANGING STRATEGIC CONDITIONS
Sweden entered the last decade with high hopes for
detente. Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and the Helsinki talks
leading to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCS) spelled the end of the cold war and the begin-
ning of a more peaceful period in European history. As
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always in the post-war period, the end of detente came later
to Sweden than to most other European nations. Only the
Defense Bill of 1981 acknowledged that relations between the
superpowers were again cooling off, but the time lag did not
matter much when it came to the practical conduct and execu-
tion of Swedish national security policy. The considerable
material resources of the defense establishment had been
gradually renewed and no fundamental change had occurred in
the direction of their use.
During the 1970's Swedish official statements on foreign
policy avoided the term "Nordic Balance". \ steady and
consistent Swedish foreign and defense policy promotes
peace, stability and low superpower presence in Northern
Europe, according to the Swedish Defense Department.
[Ref. 28].
The Swedish defense planning system, with formal study
committees, parliamentary inquiries and five-year defense
decisions, offers the student of international politics
considerable documentary evidence on the official thinking
of the Swedish leadership. let the results are somehow
devoid of linkage to the true international situatior--
tension or the lack of it between the superpowers and Europe
is indicated, and from this come scenarios for crises and
war-fighting that may or may not affect the country. For
obvious reasons of non-aligned policy the "aggression
scenarios" that link the defense structure to political and
military realities are top secret. On the record, Sweden as
such is no target of aggression, but Swedish territory--
particularly in the far north and near the Danish
Straits--provides an interesting area to observe should war
break out in Europe. [Ref. 19].
For Sweden, the development of superpower general
purpose forces has increased the demands on readiness,
mobility and strategic intelligence concerning Swedish
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forces. Th-e forces in the north are being strengthened, and
without much real attention from outside Sweden, the Swedish
high command has undertaken measures designed to react to
the situation.
In spite of Norwegian decisions on pre-stocking allied
equipment, occasional Soviet pressure on Finland and the
weakening of Danish defense, offical Swedish statements
insist that nothing fundamental has changed in the security
pattern of Northern Europe. The intensity of military
activity in the area is on a higher level than before,
however. In 1980, Swedish jet fighters were sent up daily
to counter potential intruders of Swedish air space and the
Navy intervened almost as frequently. The decision of
Parliament in 1972 to abolish ths submarine hunting capa-
bility and the expansion of Swedish territorial waters to 12
nautical miles in 1978 led to frequent violations culmi-
nating with the U-137 submarine incident in October 1981 and
the discovery of foreign submarines in Stockholm harbor in
the summer of 1983.
The two specific strategic developments that have
resulted in comments by Sweden are cruise missiles and
nuclear weapons in the Baltic. The NATO INF decision in
December 1979 led in the beginning to a debate in Sweden
cast in terms of World Far Two tainking: Would the GLCM's
violate Swedish air space on their way to Soviet targets and
what implications would this have for Swedish neutrality in
wartime? Original responses assured the public that the
Swedish defense system had a high capability to shoot down
cruise missiles. Later analysis pointed to the obvious:
the cruise missiles most threatening to Scandinavia are not
the GLCM's based on the European continent but the SLCM's
and the ALCH's based on American B-52 bombers that may
attempt to penetrate the northwestern part of Soviet air
defense. General concern is that if Swedish air space is
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violated Ly strikes enroute the Soviet anion, without Sweden
reacting to the violations, it is tantamount to a declara-
tion of non-neutrality and an invitation to the Soviets to
respond in kind against Sweden. But if cruise missiles are
launched, it means a general war in Europe and the Swedish-
Air Force will be occupied anyway, so there is a certain
mootness to the argument.
The permanent stationing of six obsolete Soviet Golf-
class submarines with SSN-5 nuclear missiles in the Baltic
in 1976 is another element of concern. Givea the number of
nuclear weapons on the Kola Peninsula and in the Leningrad
and Baltic military districts, the submarines add only
symbolic value. The confirmation that even the obsolete
Whiskey -class submarine which ran aground in October 1981
carried nuclear weapons brought a new perspective to the
issue of a nuclear free Baltic (and Soviet nuclear command-
and-control procedures). [Eef. 28].
B. SWEDISH NUCLEAR POLICY
Swedish nuclear policy for the past twenty years has
been a doctrine against nuclear weapons. In the mid-1 950's
a debate raged inside the country whether Sweden should
acquire nuclear weapons as recommended by the military, or
not. In 1959 a decision was taken to delay the final deci-
sion, a decision confirmed in 1968 when Sweden signed the
Non-proliferation Treaty. From then on interest in the
nuclear question lessened and was devoted to civil defense
and the protection of the civilian population and military
forces in a nuclear war. Civil defense was planned in the
late 1950's and built up during the 1960's. Tne risk of
nuclear attacks against the population had provided the
framework for an ambitious effort of construction of nuclear
shelters, evacuation and creation of a comman d-and-r escue
organization.
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The 1972 defense decision reversed this trend. Nuclear
terror was considered less likely and the civil defense
effort was directed to counter the effects of conventional
warfare and the secondary effects (radiation, fallout, etc.)
of a nuclear exchange on the European continent [Eef. 3].
The infrastructure was already constructed in Sweden, but
both the civil defense bureaucracy and the public forgot
about nuclear war in the 1970's. Khen the issue returned
with the NATO neutron bomb fiasco of 1973 and the INF deci-
sion of 1979, the reaction was dramatic. If nuclear war as
a possibility had been undersold in the early 1970' s, it
became oversold at the end of the decade. The bureaucracy
went on doing what it had been doing all along.
Thus current Swedish military doctrine claims tnat the
Swedish armed forces will be able to absorb a few nuclear
attacks. They are not designed to fight for long in a full
nuclear environment. The rational is that Sweden as such is
a secondary target and there is no reason why the power
blocs in Europe should cross the nuclear threshold first in
Scandinavia. The counterargument—that the vast space and
small population of the area makes it a potential target of
United nuclear warfare—is usually dismissed. The
re-emergence of the nuclear issue in Sweden came too late to
have any impact on the military defense decision of 1982,
and full impact in 1983 has yet to be evaluated. [Eef. 5],
C. DEFENSE BUDGETS AND POLITICAL CONSENSUS
During the 1970's the defense effort prDceeded without
much attention to the strategic developments of the time.
Like all Western countries, the Swedish economy was hit by
the energy crisis. In the 1950's and much of the 1960's
approximately 5% of Swedish GNP was allocated to defense.
In 1965, when detente grew earlier in Sweden than in the
6 4
rest of Europe, the figure dropped to 3.5%, where it has
remained. In absolute terms the budget increased, but of
course not enough to keep pace with the cost increase in
weapons systems and personnel. At the beginning of the
1970's the Social Democrats in power projected that the
superpowers, feeling the same cost-crunch, would also cut
their defense expenditures [ Ref . 29]. The parties in power
since 1976 have avoided international comparisons. The cost
of defense has been the subject of great consensus among the
four democratic parties. In the debates preceding the five-
year defense decision of 1982 the Social Democrats wanted a
0.5% lower defense budget than the two middle parties, and
the conservatives a 2.2% higher budget. Thus, the consensus
budget of the 1970's and 1980's was established at a level
that consumed 30% less of the GtfP than in the 1950* s and
1960's. In spite of the impressive defense capital built up
during these decades, the costs were bound to have an
effect. As the equipment of the armed forces gradually
became obsolete, it was replaced, but not to the same extent
as before.. Over time the services were forced to respond,
each in its own fashion.
D. THE DEFENSE DECISION OF JDNE 1982
In the 1982-33 fiscal year, Sweden spent $3.22 billion
(US) on defense, representing 2.9% of the country's 1981
GNP. The inflation rate for the period was 9.6%. In addi-
tion, the increased cost of defense helped frame the defense
budget issue. The Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed
Forces submitted three alternative five-year defense plans,
and parliament ratified the one providing the least economic
resources to the military. This meant that over the
following ten year period, expenditure on the peacetime
military organization would have to be cut back to roughly
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$1 (OS) billion. Modernization and strengthening of the
wartime forces are to continue, though at a reduced rate
compared to the other options. The result will be that only
eight divisions of Viggens will be acquired, instead of the
originally planned ten; that twelve, rather than fourteen,
submarines will be maintained; and that the mDdernizati on of
existing and acquisition of new material, including mine
countermeasures equipment and anti-tank missiles-- will have
to be slowed and the numbers involved reduced.
It should be noted that the June 1982 decision did
ratify the controversial proposal for indigenous development
and production of JAS second generation multi-role combat
aircraft (named Gripen) for the Swedish Air Force. By
authorizing the acquisition of the initial 140 of these
aircraft for the 1990's, the future of Sweden's independent
aircraft industry is assured, and the strength of the Air
Force will be maintained so long as the necessary procure-
ment funds continue to be allocated. In 1983 the Swedish
Social Democratic government confirmed the decision.
[Ref. 13],
E. 1983-84 DEFENSE BUDGET DECISIONS
In March 1983, the Swedish Social Democratic government
announced its decision to proceed with the development of
the Gripen multi-role aircraft. During the previous year's
parliamentary defense debate, which ended with a marginal
victory for the JAS proposal, the Social Democr ats--then in
opposition—declared themselves in favor of a new multi-role
aircraft, but they wanted a more detailed cost analysis to
be made before making a final stand on the JAS. In addi-
tion, they strongly entertained the prospect of purchasing a
foreign-built aircraft, most likely the American F-16 or
F-18 fighters, which could have been had at very low
66
comparative cost. [Kef. 9]. This proposal sparked consid-
erable debate because of its implications for Swedish
neutrality, especially in view of Soviet charges that Sweden
was in fact a silent partner in the NATO alliance. The deci-
sion was held in abeyance at that time, pending the results
of the cost-analysis. The analysis was completed at the end
of February 1983, and the Social Democrats endorsed the
Gripen.
The Social Democrats are now convinced that the program
can be accomplished within the economic framework given,
although some uncertainties prevail. The Defense Minister,
Anders Thunborg, said at a press conference to announce the
decision that "these uncertainties are not great enougn to
prevent us going ahead with the program. The cost will be
kept under very close control." [Ref. 1].
The basis for the analysis was a JAS 39 program cost of
$3,493 (US) billion at February 1981 prices, as submitted in
June 1982. This includes development work ani manufacture
of the 140 aircraft by the year 2000. The figure also
included most weapons and support equipment. Thunborg
revealed at the time that the Air Force budget estimate for
the period of development includes a reserve of 3243 (US)
million, and a reserve in the JAS program budget of 3352
(US) million to safeguard it against currency fluctuations.
Thunborg considered this sufficient to justify his
confidence that the program will stay within limits. He
stated that if something did go wrong with the program, the
numbers of aircraft would have to be reduced from 140 to 130
or by reducing "some other ambitions in the system."
[Ref. 1 ] He concluded by saying that the program can only
continue if there are no further reductions in future
defense budgets.
In May of this year, the Swedish government, working in
agreement with the opposition parties, agreed to provide an
67
additional $335 (US) million for tne defense bulgst over the
next three years to compensate for the decreased value of
the Swedish kroner because of continued high inflation
rates. The Swedish military command had previously asked
foe $350 (US) million, the government offered $200 (US)
million. But the debate which followed, sparked by
continued threats to Swedish territory and the strong
American dollar on foreign currency markets, brought about a
change in the Social Democrats' position. The additional
funds are marked for continued operation of ttiree squadrons
of the older J35 Draken intercepters, totalling about 70
aircraft, until the mid-1990' s when the last of the Gripens
will be delivered. These additional funds will allow the
Drakens to be modernized, although the extent of the modern-
ization program has not been fully defined.
The funds are also to be spent on continued moderniza-
tion of the problem areas identified earlier in this paper,
from ASW to SCM. But most significant, the money is to
assist in the purchase of the new American-built Ain-9L
Sidewinder air-to-air missile, which will be carried by the
Viggens. This is the best indication by the Swedish govern-
ment that their defense establishment relies on NATO for
support. [Ref. 24].
F. NEUTRALITY AND THE ARSS INDDSTEI
The Swedish armaments industry was built up during World
War Two. From the beginning of the Korean War, the aircraft
industry concentrated on the development and production of
combat aircraft. Four generations of over: 2000 combat
aircraft were developed and produced over the next thirty
years. Also, other advanced equipment such as tanks, subma-
rines and electronics was developed and produced in the
country. Since the major Swedish weapons producers are half
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in and half out of the defense business, the resultant
spin-off between the military and civilian research and
development sectors has been increased.
The achievement of keeping up with international mili-
tary technology has been reached through clever and selec-
tive imports of components and technology. Despite its
non-aligned status Sweden managed in the early 1S50's to
reach a bilateral agreement with the Unitei States on
exchange of military technology. In the 1970' s agreements
with most West European countries followed. The SAAB jet
fighters all have British or American engines produced under
license. The fighter variant of the Viggen has 20S foreign
components— 14SS are American. [Ref. 16].
For nearly thirty years, then, Sweden was able to remain
non-aligned and still have access to the same military tech-
nology as the European allies of America. Since it was in
the aerospace industry that Sweden seemingly achieved spec-
tacular results of independence, it was logical that aero-
space was the military field where the first impact of
financial or economic difficulty woald appear. In the
mid-1970's Sweden tried, like France, to compete with the
United States in the jet-fighter market of Denmark, Norway,
the Netherlands and Belgium. SAAB had managed to sell
Draken to Denmark in 1968, but seven years later detente was
falling apart and Sweden paid a price, like Trance, for not
belonging to the military organization of NATO. In 1978 the
Carter administration, implementing the arms trade policy of
Leslie Gelb, prevented Sweden from selling Viggens to India
because the engine was American. Since arms export plays a
small but increasing role in Swedish foreign trade, U.S.
restrictions on sales to third nations have traditionally
been unimportant. More important is the Reagan administra-
tion policy to use advanced technology as a cold war weapon.
Only after long and hard negotiations has Sweden been able
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to achieve technology release for the modified General
Electric 404 engine to power the new Gripen and the
Sidewinder missiles. Since the Gripen will have a foreign
content of over 30%, the question of technological sanctions
and their impact on neutrality will remain in the public
light for the remainder of this century. [ Ref . 29].
The question of the Viggen successor in the Swedish Air
Force became the single most important and consistent issue
in Swedish defense planning in the 1970's. This may seem
paradoxical since 7iggen is not due to be replaced until
1992 and the fighter variant was introduce! into the Air
Force only at the end of the last decade. But in a nation
that fights no wars, long range planning seems to involve
the most important problems, especially since the question
concerns enoraous expenditures. The Viggen replacement and
the future of the Air Force became entangled in the
doctrinal debate, but the international strategic dimensions
were never brought out.
It was the cost of Viggen that had caused a major
controversy in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In fact,
the cost for the 329 aircraft increased by 55£ in constant
prices, a normal figure for advanced weapon systems. The
Viggen system always remained within the Air Force budget,
but its opponents managed to create the illusion that the
aircraft had exceeded all budgetary limits. In 1972 a
narrow majority of Social Democrats decided that Viggen
should have no advanced combat aircraft as a successor.
[Ref. 16].
Most of the decade was spent debating the issue, and
given the new fashion of alternative planning and keeping
options open, no less than twelve formal investigations by
politicians, bureaucrats and military explored the topic.
Since the strike variant Viggen was to be replaced first,
the original plans called for a combined trainer/light
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strike aircraft named B3LA. The Conservative Defense
Minister managed to appropriate $7 (US) million for the E3LA
in 1977, but his Liberal successor took away the money one
year later when the rare changed to Sk. 33. Finally, in 1980
the government announced a two-year competition for a multi-
purpose combat aircraft, JAS. 3eneral Dynamics presented
the F-16, McDonnell-Douglas the F-18, and Northrup the F-5G.
After an evaluation based on the artificial ground rules
formulated by the politicians-- JAS, now Gripen, is to be
half the size and cost 60% of Viggen --the Air Force and the
Commander in Chief recommended that the proposal formulated
by Industrial Group JAS (the Viggen industries) be accepted.
The Chief of the Army opposed the decision, arguing that the
selected engine will give the new aircraft a too low capa-
bility at the end of the century [Ref. 28]. As outlined in
the previous section, the Social Democrats originally
opposed the funding, but have since altered their position.
The Swedish project had the advantage of creating larger
employment in the nation than the American competitors. The
project follows the same pattern as Viggen, the same indus-
tries are to develop and produce essentially the same compo-
nents as they do now, but industry is to take a higher risk.
The financial penalties are higher and so are the technical
risks. Under current plans Gripen will replace the strike
Viggens by 1992 and then gradually all other versions some-
time after the year 2000. In this decade, then, Sweden has
retained the capability to develop all the weapons systems
the country currently needs, but Gripen is to be the last
Swedish developed combat aircraft; the aerospace industry
plans to be 50% civilian as early as 1990. [Ref. 28],
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G. THE DOMESTIC ASPECT
Since tha Second World War Swedish defense decisions
have been taken by bread consensus among the four democratic
parties in Parliament. About every four years defense
committees representing the four parties have been appointed
to prepare the next defense decision, which since 1972 have
covered a five-year period. Long-range planning introduced
in 1958 was further refined and formalized with the 1972
decision to introduce an elaborate system of perspective
planning, program planning, system planning and program
budgeting. The new system had been introduce! by politi-
cians who thought they could use it to control the military
and cut the defense budget in a rational manner. Instead
the military mastered all the intricacies of the system much
better than the politicians. It was a good educational tool
foe acquainting the politicians with the facts of Swedish
security, tut it played no decisive role in the important
questions of aircraft acquisition and conscription, which
were the key defense issues of the time.
The defense decisions of 1972, 1977 and 1982 nearly
coincided with the Social Democratic Party Congresses of
1972, 1975, 1978 and 1981. Traditionally, members of the
pacty congresses have been more radical than the party lead-
ership, with the defense debates and resolutions reflecting
this political bent. Yet the consensus on defense has not
changed since 1972. In the wake of detente the radical wing
of the Social Democratic Party finally saw an opportunity
for substantial cuts in the defense budget.
The most important reason for this is the power shift of
1976 that broke forty years of Social Democratic rule.
Another reason is the harder political climate in Europe and
the world since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
imposition of martial law in Poland. The failure of the
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anti-defense advocates represented by Mrs. Theorin in the
1974 defense committee to move their political colleagues
also played a role, and Mrs. Iheorin was defeated in 1975.
By 1 978 the party was no longer in power and the nuclear
issue had re-emerged in Europe. [Ref. 8].
Another influential person in the defense debate, Mrs.
Myrdal, had published an acclaimed work in 1976 which lent
credibility to the anti-nuclear stand of the party. The
party decided that less emphasis in the future should be put
on conventional military defense and more on civil and
economic defense. The party managed to combine the two
incompatible ideas by expressing the thought that the threat
of nuclear war was so great that the concept of conventional
invasions and a defense designed to meet such a threat was
obsolete. Yet detente still prevailed, so the defense
budget could be cut.
The sobering world events cast their shadow over the
1981 congress, dominated by totally different issues than
defense. The goal was to regain power in 19B2 at the same
time as international developments had proven Irs. Theorin
and her sympathizers wrong about defense. A few months
later the "Whiskey on the rocks" episode revealed that
Swedish public opinion was much more pro-defense than
expected. Contrary to predictions, the peace issue played a
very small role in the 1982 elections. The report of the
Palme commission on disarmament and security had received
little publicity in Sweden. The nuclear free zone issue had
been defused by the submarine grounding incident and the
peace movement discredited by the fiasco of an attempted
summer peace march to Moscow and Minsk [Ref. 11]- The
public, worried about jobs and inflation, could not be
persuaded to think about the probability of war in Europe.
The five-year defense plan of June 1982 had made the issue a
non-political one.
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H. DEFENSE DOCTRINE AND FORCE STRUCTURE
The failure of the Social Democratic left wing to charge
the direction of the defense effort in tha 1970's was
important to the current defense policy. Given the tight
party discipline, the threat was probably never too great;
more realistic was the effort to change the military struc-
ture of the armed services and with it the military
doctrine. The campaign had three major elements: polit-
ical, economic and doctrinal.
The 1968 defense decision hai ended with considerable
controversy. The ruling Social Democrats had approved the
production of Viggen but given the rising costs of defense
equipment and the growing detente in Europe, they were
looking for other alternatives. The Air Force had teen the
glamor arm of the services, receiving a proportionally
higher share of the defense budget than the Amy. In 1968
the Army's territorial strategists saw an opportunity to
find support for their ideas. During the next seven years
they advocated a large conscript "People's Any" armed with
inexpensive but efficient weapons. Since they were allied
with the party in power and appealed to romantic but unreal-
istic parallels with armies in Vietnam and Yugoslavia, they
at first succeeded in getting their position placed in the
1972 defense decision on total defense. But the extreme
debate which followed ultimately resulted in defeat for the
extreme territorialists, for by 1975 it was already seen
that such a position was not realistic, given the threat
from the Soviets.
With the constant budget level, the n;ost important ques-
tion was the development of the force structure and the role
of Swedish defense in Northern Europe. Ever since Sweden's
decision not to join NATO in 1949 the defense doctrine has
teen based on the idea of an aggressor's marginal resources
7U
being used against Sweden. As late as 1975 the Swedish
defense staff estimated that it would take at least 30 divi-
sions to conquer the country in a conventional war. At the
beginning of the 1970's the goal of lefense was established
at delaying the enemy, maintaining political freedom of
actioD to negotiate with the enemy about cease-fire, peace,
and freedom, and discussing with potential allies about
assistance and intervention. [Ref. 30],
As long as 5% of GNP was devoted to defense, Sweden was
able to field 30 divisions after mobilization, maintain a
sizeable Navy of destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines
and equip one of the largest Air Forces in Europe. 3.5r of
GN? was not enough for the job, but the conscript system
remained the basis of the defense effort, and politicians
claimed that to change it would deny the defense structure
of popular support. As a result, 90% of all twenty-year old
men spend 7.5-15 months in basic training and 73% are placed
in the ready reserve units. And because o£ the different
manpower requirements and the differing effects of rising
technological costs on each of the three services, each of
them approached their organizational problems in a different
way. [Ref. 8].
The changes have resulted in the Navy and Air Force
being cut in half, but the Army has been successful in main-
taining support and has only been forced to reduce its size
by three divisions from the original thirty, and this spread
out over a twenty-six year period (See Table 7). In 1972
the Army planned to have twelve infantry brigades ten years
later; in fact, eleven brigades have been modernized, but
instead of moving the brigades of the older type to local
defense, the Army has kept them in the field army.
Deficiencies in fire-power, mobility and all-weather anti-
aircraft capability as well as training hamper the older
brigades of the 1960's. Also, the new brigade type of
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TABLE V
Swedish Force Structure After Mobilization
1966 1977 1982 1992*
Old Infantry Brigades 20 20 11 7
New Infantry Brigades -- -- 9 11
Norrland Brigades 4 4 4 5
Armored Brigades 6 4 4 4
Destroyers/Frigates 17 8 2
Submarines 21 17 12 12-14
Coast Artillery Battalions 41 34 30 29
Fighter Squadrons 28 17 12 12
Strike Squadrons 12 5.5 5.5 5.5
Light Strike Squadrons — 5 5
Reconnaissance Squadrons 10 8 6 6
planned
post-1977 is not as well equipped or trained as the super-
power forces. In order to absorb all conscripts into the
mobilized military organization, the Army has not spent
enough money on hardware and too much on manpower. Even so,
the basic training period was cut from 9 to 7. 5 months in
1972, and refresher training has been cut as well.
[Ref. 22].
Operational planning was changed toward the end of the
decade and the armed forces began to prepare alternative
plans to meet the enemy inside the country's borders. 3ut
in 1980 the trend was reversed, refresher training was
resumed on a larger scale, several transports were bought to
increase the airlift capability, and the future fighter
force was adjusted from 8 to 12 squadrons. As a result of
the U-137 incident more funds were allocated to the restora-
tion of submarine hunting capability in the form of helicop-
ters and specially equipped fast attack missile boats. The
mobilization and strategic warning systems were upgraded due
to the increased risk of surprise attack.
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The changing force structure has operational conse-
quences that are infrequently discussed in Sweden. Within
the nation most people do no think in these teems, and those
who do seldom analyze the implications out of fear of
breaking the unwritten and unspoken "rules" of Swedish
non-alignment. [Ref. 10].
In the future, Sweden will be force! to make a
decision— for economic reasons— on whether to have an intro-
vert or extrovert strategy for the armed forces. An extro-
vert, Air Force- and Navy-oriented strategy allows force
projection, alleit modest, in the Baltic region and enacles
Sweden to act outside her borders. An introvert,
Army-oriented strategy defends the territory but implies
reliance on other nations that will then have to come to the
aid of Sweden. The Army has argued in terms of a territo-
rial army but in fact proceeded to acguire much of the
sophisticated equipment of a large field army. The Navy and
the Air Force have been forced to face the consequences of
inflation and escalating costs and have proportionately
reduced the size of their organizations while maintaining a
high technological level.
The refusal to discuss Sweden in strategic terms
explains another aspect of the Swedish defense debate.
Official Swedish policy is non-alignment in peace leading to
neutrality in war, a concept founded on the experience of
two fcorld Wars, both of which were of long duration and
conventional in nature. As long as Swedish defense is
discussed in terms of a marginal strategy of forces designed
to conquer Swedish territory or violate Swedish air and sea
space, the Swedish argument is realistic, since the idea of
a conventional hot war is easy to understand. But to
discuss the Swedish defense structure in terms of deterrence
or of becoming a vital part of the Northern European
security system where different forces play different roles,
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is difficult in Sweden except on a very simple and basic
level (as is usually the case where politicians recognize a
power vacuum that they attempt to fill). [Ref. 31].
Since both the public and the politicians rarely discuss
international relations in power terms and prefer to view
the international strategic debate in moralistic terms, the
European defense debate and its implications are often
misunderstood in Sweden [Ref. 30]. Given Sweden's foreign
policy the two discussions are decoupled.
This lack of realistic outlook became particularly prom-
inent in the very early 1980 's in a myth surrounding Swedish
security policy--the renewed importance of the peace move-
ment. Following NATO's INF decision and the election of
President Reagan, the Swedish movements at first had diffi-
culty finding focus. The Swedish debate was carried out on
several levels: the Labor Party split and the stronger
forces worked toward a nuclear-free zone covering all of
Scandinavia; the popular movement worked against nuclear
weapons in general, demanding a nuclear-free zone and going
through the motions of marches and demonstrations. The size
of the organized movements has been relatively small— about
30,000--and their impact limited. In spite of expectations,
the peace issue never fully surfaced in the 1982 campaign.
The devensive will of the Swedish people has remained
constantly high in the last few years. The percentage of
Swedes who have stated they will resist if the country is
attacked has risen from 73ft in 1972 to 78& in 1982. Support
for increased defense spending has risen from 17% in 1972 to
24% in the last election year--the highest figure in the
past twenty-five year period. [Ref. '23].
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I. ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE
The coordination of arms control negotiations carried
out by the Swedish Foreign Ministry and national security
policy directed from the Defense Ministry has not always
been done in the most professional manner. The Unden Plan
for nuclear free-zones introduced at the United Nations in
1961 was proposed without the previous knowledge of the
Swedish Defense Staff. Over the years, the Swedish arms
control apparatus has been refined,the military is repre-
sented on all delegations, and the negotiators from the
Foreign Ministry are supported by the large technical
resources of the Defense Research Institute. From the
beginning of the Geneva negotiations in 1962, Sweden played
a prominent role. Among the non-aligned nations Sweden had
the highest technological expertise and managed to appear as
a leader.
For several reasons, Sweden began to change directions
in its arms control policy in the 1970's. After the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty and the test ban treat, the Geneva
negotiations achieved few concrete results. The non-aligned
group of nations at Geneva and in the United Nations
expanded and took on an anti-Western Third Worli stance that
did not correspond to Swedish interests. The CSCE and the
Helsinki Declaration of 1975 had at first raised unrealistic
hopes among many Swedish politicians.
Since Sweien is non-aligned, the United Nations and its
organizations have been the natural forums for Sweden to
express her positions. The decline of the U.N. has
certainly hurt Sweden's approach. The important negotia-
tions affecting Swedish security as well are bilateral talks
between the power blocs in Europe--the SALT and START nego-
tiations between the United States and Soviet Union, the
MBFR talks between selected NATO and Warsaw Pact nations,
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and the INF talks between the U.S. and the Soviets.
Realizing that the important talks now will concern Europe,
Sweden has (like France) offered to host a European security
conference sometime in the 1980's- [Ref. 10].
The one issue which could have important political and
strategic implications for Sweden--the question of a
Scandinavian nuclear-free zone— has not achieved any prog-
ress. Occasionally proposed by Finland and politely but
firmly rejected by the other Scandinavian countries, the
issue has become more substantial in the last few years.
Since most Swedish strategic debates originate in Norway,
the Swedish Social Democrats in 198 1 expressed interest in
the idea proposed by the Norwegian Labor Party government.
Parliament instructed the government to explore the question
with other Scandinavian governments, and the Swedish Foreign
Ministry was urged to study the question.
The reaction to the Soviet submarine grounding in
October of that year complicated the issue. All Swedish
party leaders at first claimed that the Baltic had to be
included in any nuclear-free zone. In March 1982 the Under
Secretary of Foreign Affairs added special conditions to the
proposal (including the control of Soviet nuclear weapons on
Soviet territory near Sweden) which all but ended any
further discussion. Although the Social Democrats criti-
cized this position that assumed the right to inspection of
Soviet military installations, the new Conservative govern-
ment in Norway let the question fade. Just as had happened
in so many previous Swedish foreign policy debates, the
whole issue took place in an international vacuum. Why the
Soviet Union should restrain the movements and armaments of
military vessels in the Baltic, or why the United States
should sign a treaty designed to undermine Norwegian and
Danish NATO membership were questions never asked.
[Ref. 13].
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J. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: THE SILENT PARTNER?
As Sweden continues the latest five-year defense period,
many questions remain. Because of a complicated system of
indexing defense costs, the Swedish armed forces in the
previous five-year period have had additional funds to use,
and while much of this was spent buying new equipment,
little was done to address the problem of an organization
too large for its structure. The most recent funds,
including those earmarked for the new Gripen aircraft and
other Air Force associated weapon systems, are only a tempo-
rary solution to a problem which mast be faced in the not-
to-distant future. Sometime in the next few years the
choice between the introvert and extrovert strategies will
have to be faced realistically, and the doctrinal debate
between the services finally resolved. The move toward the
Air Force and Navy has been facilitated by the events of the
early 1980's.
The superpowers have an increased interest in the
Scandinavian region, and their presence there continues to
grow. Since Swedish forces are now smaller than they used
to be, the marginal balance in a crisis or war has tipped
against from Sweden. The U-137 incident showed that the old
scenario of a long period of enemy build-up followed by a a
large conventional invasion might not be the only valid
threat perspective, but it also showed the futility of
worrying too much about threats based on the vulnerability
of an advanced society or the current North-South debate, as
long as traditional military threats have not been
addressed.
. Political blackmail, crisis management, and the
potential for quick-strike and grab operations (as high-
lighted by the suspected Soviet submarine commandos in
Karlskrona earlier this year) will place difficult demands
on Swedish decision-making and • flexible response in the
future.
81
A reappraisal of Sweden's security goals will probably
te necessary in the future. If Sweden's military strength
appears to be faltering or inadequate, she will nave to
borrow strength from others. This is the solution chosen by
Denmark and Norway in accepting membership in NATO. The
location of Sweden between the superpower blocs makes this
solution unlikely, but not impossible, for to do so would go
against all current political aims, hopes oc expectations;
however, it would fall within the range of legitimate,
future-oriented political analysis. It is important to
remember, however, that such a decision would conflict with
more than a century of Swedish security tradition, and the
outside world would probably interpret a Swedish reversal in
policy as a drastic and dangerous change in the regional
balance of northern Europe.
A more likely reaction in Sweden would te to avoid, as
far as possible, any formal change and retain the current
policy of neutrality, placing more reliance oq the idea that
neither the Soviets nor the Western powers will be inclined
to increase tension by taking advantage of Sweden's reduced
strength. In such a case, Sweden would then not present the
surrounding world with the traditional "strong" Swedish
defense model, but she would not necessarily be forced to
adopt the weaker example provided by Austria. The real
position would fall somewhere between the two: in principle
Sweden would proclaim the same security policy as today, but
internally with less confidence and externally with less
credibility than at present.
A defense structure designed to counter the current and
future threats is required. So is a defense policy,
supported by public debate, which more realistically and
closely links Swedish defense and security to the security
of Western Europe. This is not to say that Sweden should
work toward eventual NATO membership. It simply states that
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the reality of the situation which Sweden faces is such that
Gustafsson's statement about "knowinj where we belong" is
not strong enough. Sweden remains non-aligned in peace-
time, but the cherished neutrality in time of war cannot be
guaranteed without the strong presence of NATO to ensure
that the Swedish armed forces can carry out their assigned
missions. That, more than any otner factor, is the reality
which Sweden must face. And for that reason she must look
forward to remaining the silent partner in NATO.
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APPENDIX A
BRIEFING IN STOCKHOLM ON THE NEW DEFENCE BILL, MARCH 1 1TH
1977
(By Dnder-Secretary of State for Defence, Gucnar Nordbeck)
1 • IHi£2^iict ion
Yesterday the Government Bill on Total Defence for the
coining five-year period was presented to the Riksdag. The
Bill presents proposals concerning the implementation of oar
security policy and the continued development of total
defence on the longer range. The Bill also gives the envi-
saged orientation of the so-called programme plans for the
period 1977/73-198 1/32.
The Bill is mainly based on the proposals advanced in
two successive reports by the 1974 Parliamentary Committee
on Defence. Dp to a couple of months ago this committee has
been evaluating the findings of a four year, extensive anal-
ysis of the defence organization.
This is an important Bill because, for one thing, all
parts of our total defence--military , civil, economic and
other branches of defence— are for the first time dealt with
in the same Bill.
This new approach is emphasized by the fact that the
Prime Minister lays down the basic principles of Swedish
security policy and total defence in the main text. In
eight annexes to the main Bill the ministers responsible for
different parts of total defence present their proposals
within their respective areas of competence.
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2- Securitv Policy
In order to characterize the substance of the 3ill it
snould first be noted that the Prime minister lays down the
continuity of Sweden's national security policy and the role
of national defence. Ke points to the overwhelming support
the basic principles of our security policy have in Swedish
public opinion.
There has in fact for a long time been a broad consensus
in Sweden on the orientation of our security policy and the
need for a strong defence commanding respect. One conse-
quence of this, says the Prime Minister, has been agreement
on annual allocations of a considerable proportion of
national resources for defence purposes.
The Prime Minister expresses the general objective of
our security policy in the following way.
Sweden's security policy, like that of other countries,
aims to preserve the nation's independence. The goals of
our security policy should therefore be to assure the
nation's freedom of action in all situations by means we
ourselves choose, so that within our boarders (sic) we can
preserve and develop our society in accordance with our own
values in political, economic, social, cultural and all
other respects, and at the same time work in the world for
international detente and peaceful development.
This is still our goal, the Prime Minister declares.
He recalls that the Swedish policy of non-participation
in alliances in peace-time aimed at neutrality in the event
of war is not internationally guaranteed or established by
treaty. Sweden has itself chosen and formulated its
security policy. The credibility of this policy is there-
fore not dependent on international guarantees. It rests
.primarily on the foreign policy and defence policy we pursue
in peacetime.
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An essential precondition of neutrality policy is that
the rest of the world has confidence in oar will and
respects our ability to firmly pursue the policy we have
chosen.
Sweden will also in the future make every effort to
strengthen the United Nations in the work of the organiza-
tion to prevent and settle international conflicts. But the
ability of small states to influence international develop-
ments is limited. In the implementation of our security
policy we must, therefore, the Prime Minister says,
constantly assess development trends in the world around us
and take into consideration what risks these may involve for
our security.
In spite of the determination of the super-powers and
the military blocs to maintain political detente--ef forts
which are partly founded on the determination to avoid any
development which might lead to nuclear war--it is a fact
that both military blocs maintain large forces in Europe.
Swedish neutrality policy must therefore continue to be
supported by a strong, all-round total defence in order to
retain its crediblity. Against this background, Mr. Falldin
concludes, there is no contradiction between Sweden's deep
involvement in international work for peace and disarmament
and our efforts to give Swedish neutrality policy the
support of an all-round total defence.
It is considered that the balance of power between the
great powers will persist in the foreseeable future. Since
the forces of the great powers are primarily tied up with
each other, even a small country like Sweden is able to
build up and maintain a defence which adequately supports
its security policy. Also in the future, our total defence
should have such a strength, structure and preparedness that
in a situation of crisis and conflict in Europe no potential
aggressor can regard threats, pressures or attacks on Sweden
worthwhile.
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A military attack has to be considered as the gravest
threat to oar security in view of its consequences. The
deterrent effect of our total defence therefore still rests
primarily on the strength of military defence.
Total defence also plays an essential role in peace-
time, Mr. Faildin stresses. A substantial weakening of the
strength of Swedish defence as compared to that of other
countries can upset stability and balance in northern
Europe. A firm and consistent Swedish foreign and defence
policy promotes peace and stability in northern Europe. The
pursuit of this policy must also be in the interests of
other countries.
3- The Concept and Orientation of Swedish Tot_al Defence
Our total defence is an expression of our determination
to safe-guard the nation's security and independence. Total
defence is, therefore, the concern of the entire population
and is founded on the premise that every citizen contributes
to the best of his ability to the defence of the country.
This is why we have compulsory military service, civil
defence duty and other types of compulsory service. The
voluntary defence organizations and our popular movements
also play an important role in strengthening the foothold of
the total defence idea in our country.
The development of society in all industrialized coun-
tries leads to increased vulnerability to other kinds of
threats and pressures. Added to this, future wars and
crises may afflict the entire society and population to a
greater extent and in other ways than before. Consequently,
total defence must be seen as an integral part of society
and reasonable account of the needs of total defence must be
taken in the future development of society. A development
along these lines will reduce our vulnerability and increase
our security.
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mobilization organization/ it should be possible to take
advantage of early warnings before a military attack.
Total defence should also comprise measures aimed at
diminishing the consequences of so-called peace-time crises.
Eecause of the necessities of war all other branches of
total defence must be adapted to how the military defence is
intended to functions.
The primary role of civil defence will still be to
assist the population and protect it from the consequences
of warfare/ with special emphasis on the effects of conven-
tional weapons. Protection against ABC weapons should be
organized within reasonable cost limits where this is
possible. The extensive production of shelters for the
population will, as before, be concentrated to those popula-
tion centers which would be particularly exposed to military
operations. The local authorities are responsible for plans
for building shelters and within a few years the whole
program will be financed via the national budget.
As regards economic defence, the preparedness to supply
raw materials, semi-manufactures and finished products to
the community during national emergency situations will be
substantially improved. This means both increased stock-
piling and further administrative preparations. In accor-
dance with the International Emergency Programme crude oil
stock-piling is being increased.
As regards other parts of total defence, preparations
for psychological defence and medical care in war-time will
be improved.
The Defence Committee has studiei and considered the
possible role which non-military resistance, often called
civil resistance, could be given within the framework of our
security policy. It has concluded, however, that other
countries are likely to interpret a deliberate Swedish
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choice not to prepare an armed defence as a lack of will and
purpose to assert the independence of the country. Our
declared foreign policy would not then be credible. The
Minister of Defence shares the opinion of the Committee and
concludes also that civil resistance can consequently not be
a substitute for military defence.
The diagram below shows the proposed budget allocations
foe the fiscal year 1977/78 by each component of total
defence.
In the Bill substantial reinforcements are suggested for
the non-military parts of defence.













4 • Hilit ar y_ Defence
Ever since the Second World Sar Sweden has sought to
maintain a strong military defence, both in quantity and in
quality. But in this respect, development during the last
two decades has brought difficult problems in its train.
These are not only the problems of rapidly increasing
personnel costs and other consumption outlays but also the
upsurging costs of modern weapon systems. In all industrial
nations, Sweden included, the difficulty of attaining a
suitable balance in the defence budget between consumption
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an I investments becomes a growingly urgent task for the
defence planners ana politicians responsible.
During the period 1969-1975, for instance, the shares of
personnel costs in Sweden's military oudget rose 3 percent,
while at the same time personnel was reduced by 4 percent.
Rising personnel costs cut down the resources available for
the procurement of weapon systems.
When the resources for military defence are at a given
level, a nation cannot solve this problem by merely
stressing either the need for quantity or for quality.
Further, due to the inertness of any military defence organ-
ization, imbalance between consumption and investments
cannot be adjusted within a short period of time.
This was the real problem the Government had to face
when preparing this Bill. We must gradually adapt our mili-
tary defence to changing conditions within the limits of our
defence posture.
The main feature of this posture is its defensive char-
acter. The need for a considerable number of field units
must also in the future be met by the conscription system.
It will give us a war-time organization of 700,000 men when
completely mobilized. The current experiment with a short-
ened period of basic military service and the modified mili-
tary refresher training of those conscripts who are selected
as officers is also necessary. Efficient and realistic
training must prepare both officers and conscripts for
meeting the demands which can be made of them in event of
war. At the same time improvements in social benefits for
conscripts must continue.
Cur military defence must be able to operate over large
areas of the country. It should be possible to concentrate
forces to the coasts and frontiers in order to make the best
use of geographical advantages. The fact that our country
is mainly surrounded by water ought to be exploited in order
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to inflict losses on an aggressor during the most vulnerable
phase of an invasion. Parts of the defence forces must be
so strategically mobile that they can be brought up in
concentrations on the various possible invasion routes and
go into action there at short notice. Stubborn resistance
over the whole country must be possible in the event of an
aggressor succeeding in penetrating deeply into the country.
Even in the latter case, our military operations should
continue also at sea and in the air.
Such a defence posture can only be assured in the long
run by continuous adaptation and by the establishment of a
realistic balance between consumption and investments. In
the Bill the Government has chosen the following means to
this end:
1. An increase in budget appropriations to military
defence by 400 million crowns a year during the next
five-year period.
2. Exploiting our advanced knowledge and our experience
in research and development of qualified weapon
systems in order to create systems suited to our
specific defensive posture.
3. Establishing mixes with high- and low-performance
weapon systems in order to achieve a better overall
effective utilization of the resources allocated to
military defence.
4. Economies by decreasing some consumption outlays.
On the one hand, the additional 400 million crowns a
year must be spent on urgent consumption outlays. The
increase in allocations will, therefore, not directly
benefit equipment procurement. On the other hand, budget
allocations to the important equipment procurement sector
might have decreased further if these additional resources
had not been proposed. Without this increased budgetary
pledge the funds necessary for consumption would be
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transferred from the weapon sector with a consequent accel-
erated imbalance between consumption and investments.
The possibility of replacing at least some part of
expensive weapon systems with cheaper ones within the frame-
work of our defence posture has been strongly emphasized
during the last decade. In the Bill the Government attaches
great importance to the fact that modern technology can be
used for producing light missiles and other weapons of
extremely high effectiveness at reasonable costs. Therefore
it is very important for us to have a capability of our own
for developing different types of missiles and other guided
weapons with high accuracy. For that purpose the close
coordination of missile development between the industries
involved seems necessary.
Our Army brigades are essential components in our
defence posture. The intention is that they should be up to
internatio.nal quality standards. The problem to be solve!
is how to find the best possible mix of brigades designed
for different assignments. The Government proposes the
following mix over the next five years as a basis for future
improvements. More than ten of our present twenty infantry
brigades will, as in the past, be continuously modernized
with special emphasis on fire-power and mobility. Anti-tank
and anti-aircraft weapons are given high priority. The
other infantry brigades will keep their present organiza-
tion. The four Norrland brigades will be retained and
modernized. The armored units should include four armored
brigades, existing tank and armored battalions and tank
companies.
As suggested already anti-tank weapons will have a very
important function in the future. Therefore high perform-
ance anti-tank weapons ought to be available in all field
combat units. A new light anti-tank missile based on modern
technology will be developed for that purpose.
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An issue which demands specific attention by the
Government concerns the future design of the Air Force.
This problem must be considered over a very long period of
time.
The re-equipment of the Air Force ground attack squad-
rons with the AJ 37 Viggen will soon be completed. The
war-time organization will comprise 5 1/2 squadrons. It
will also include 5 squadrons of the light trainer SK 60
equipped to perform close support tasks. In the late 1980's
it is intended to start replacing both aircraft.
The future of the Air Force ground attack units is a
rather difficult question. The intercepter aircraft JA 37
Viggen should be developed into a ground attack version,
called A20. It will also have some surveillance capability.
Thorough analysis carried out by the Defence Staff has indi-
cated that the A20 should be completed witn a new close
support aircraft called B3LA, which will have a secondary
role as a trainer. A mix with a new light trainer with a
somewhat limited close support capability is also of
interest.
The mix of A20 and B3LA aircraft would essentially
contribute to the effectiveness of our defensive defence
posture. B3LA is adapted to specific Swedish requirements.
It is intended to be developed and produced by Swedish
industries. If not, the Swedish capability to develop qual-
ified military aircraft should be reduced step by step.
Such a capability has for a long time ensured us the contin-
uous support of military aircraft adapted to our needs and
conditions without acquiring them abroad.
Further studies are however necessary as a basis ^T-
final decision on the future composition of the ground
attack system. Such a decision is intended to be made in
the autumn this year. These studies are delegated to a
governmental committee. Its main task is to analyze (sic)
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how the costs for the B3LA could be limited and how the
stability of the cost estimates could be ensured. This
requires more exact specifications for the aircraft. When
making the final decision the government must also pay
regard to the state finances and national economy. It is
therefore still an open guestion whether the B3LA will be
acquired or not.
The intercepter JA 37 Viggen will te produced for our
air defence during coming years for at least 8 squadrons.
Decisions concerning research and development of a successor
need not to be made in the near future. Tentative analyses
of the future air defence system have begun and must concen-
trate on finding a suitable balance between intercepters,
air defence missiles, surveillance, and operational control.
The acquisition of an intercepter for the 1990 's can be
provided by Swedish development and production, by produc-
tion under licence (sic) of an aircraft designed abroad, or
by importing finished aircraft from other countries. These
possibilities are affected by the decision on B3LA.
Tor a long time our Navy has been undergoing
re-equipment with light surface units. These units should
te armed with surface-to-surface missiles which will consid-
erably increase the effectiveness of our surface fleet.
The already commenced procurement of the third mine-
layer should be completed. Considering the great importance
of mine warfare within our defence posture the supply of
naval mines is essential. In order to meet requirements as
regards the quality of mine-sweeping capability, minehunters
should be procured.
Submarine units will also be essential in the future for
attacking invasion forces at sea. The capability to develop
and procure submarines within Sweden will be maintained.
Conditions should also be created for the qualified
surface units to operate in flotilla formation. Heavy
mobile coastal artillery should be developed and procured.
Some of the older coastal artillery units should be
modernized.
The fourth of the Government's means to achieve balance
between consumption and investments was economies obtained
by decreasing some consumption outlays.
Many of the possible measures yield results on the
longer range only. Moreover, in the short run they may
involve costly investments. But they have to be accepted in
orler to achieve a proper balance in the future.
This fact is very obvious in the ongoing reduction and
rationalization of our regiment administrations which prima-
rily are peace-time installations for training of
conscripts. According to the Defence Committee, reductions
should, in addition to those already decided on, apply to
three or four regiment administrations of the Army and the
Navy together with a reduction. of some administrative units.
The development of the Air Force may mean that other peace-
time stations, .in addition to F11 in Nykoping and F12 in
Kalmar, will have to be closed down. A governmental
committee will this summer be presenting proposals
concerning reductions of regiment administrations. In this
context I want to point out that there is no direct rela-
tionship between the number of regiment administrations and
the number of war units which can be mobilized.
Consequently a reduction of regiment administrations does
not entail a reduction of the number of war units.
Prompt and vigorous measures ace necessary to reduce the
number of employees. A reduction of 2500 people is planned
for the period 1977-32.
Costs and personnel requirements for commaad staffs and
central authorities should be reduced and personnel should
be re-deployed for the benefit of training conscripts and
military units.
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The Swedish security policy will remain unchanged. Ee
share the prDblems of rapidly increasing costs with most
other industrial countries. This means that in spite of
increased funding, the number of the most qualified units
will continue to decrease. In the longer run, we try to
compensate this trend by unsing modern technology for devel-
oping cheaper but highly effective weapons. These ana the
entire defence system have to be adapted to our defensive
defence posture and the international development.
Therefore our defence will still more be characterized as a
high-low mix. We face the future with optimism. The aim of
our efforts is still a strong national defence which firmly
supports our policy of neutrality and contributes to peace
and stability in northern Europe.
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APPENDIX B
STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
{Mr. Thorbjorn Falldin on Swedish Security Policy and Total
Defence (Bill on the orientation of security policy and the
future development "of total defence)}, March 11th, 1977.
Swedish society is distinguished by a deep and funda-
mental community of values. This is maintained and
strengthened by the' implementation of those economic and
social conditions which are in accordance with the wishes
and efforts of the Swedish people. The internal stability,
which such a development in all areas of society creates,
will regain an essential precondition for the ability of the
government to pursue a firm policy in peace as well as in
war-time.
There is overwhelming support in Swedish public opinion
for the basic principles of our security policy. These
principles retain their validity even in a world where both
foreign policy and defence policy has to be formulated with
due regard to changing conditions, such as increased inter-
national independence and the increasing vulnerability of
industrial societies.
Ever since the 1S68 Riksdag decision, the general objec-
tive of our security policy has been exprsssed in the
following way.
Sweden's security policy, like that of other countries,
aims to preserve the nation's independence. The goals of
our security policy should therefore be to assure the
nation's freedom of action in all situations by means we
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ourselves choose, so that within our borders we can preserve
and develop our society in accordance with our own values in
political, economic, social, cultural and all other respects
and at the same time work: in the world for international
detente and peaceful development.
This is still our goal. To this end, our security
policy is founded upon an interaction between foreign
policy, defence policy, our policy on international disarma-
ment issues, trade policy and international development
cooperation policy.
Countries choose various paths for attaining their
security policy goals. The choice is greatly determined by
historical experience and geographical position. A uniquely
long period of peace has made and still maKes its mark on
Sweden's choice. During this period we developed our policy
of non-participation in alliances in peace-time aimed at
neutrality in the event of war. The fact that Sweden has
been able to keep out of war for a long time is one reason
why this policy is so deeply rooted in the will of the
Swedish people.
The possibilities for our country to stay out of war and
serious conflicts also in the future, while maintaining our
freedom and independence, is best furthered by our policy of
neutrality. It also strengthens our ability to contribute
to efforts in various contexts for promoting a better and
more peaceful world.
The Swedish policy of neutrality is not internationally
guaranteed or established by treaty. Sweden has itself
chosen and formulated its security policy. The credibility
of this policy is therefore not dependent on international
guarantees. It rests primarily on the foreign policy and
defence policy we pursue in peace-time.
An essential precondition of neutrality policy is that
the rest of the world has confidence in our will and
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respects our ability firmly to pursue the policy we have
chosen. If our intention is to be clearly understood and
respected, our policy cannot be made dependent on transient
factors, but must be pursued with consistency and
steadfastness.
Such international ties—political, economic, and
others-- which make an illusion of our ability to remain
neutral in war-time are unacceptable. This means that we
cannot take part in binding cooperation within a group of
states for the purpose of drawing up common standpoints on
foreign policy. There are also limits to our ability to
cooperate in any transfer of the right of decision from
national to international bodies. A close and extensive
economic cooperation between Sweden and other nations is
desirable from many points of view. In my opinion, this
cooperation should be further deepened. But in the imple-
mentation of our security policy we must also observe the
risks involved in the type of dependence that can be
exploited to demand political ani military concessions of
us.
Fe wish to contribute to and work for greater respect
for every nations' freedom and right of self-determination.
We also work for social and economic justice, political
detente, military disarmament as well as extensive and
trustful cooperation between rations. Lasting peace in the
world can only be secured if these endeavors are kept at
full strength. Every step towards increased international
security also promotes the attainment of our own security
policy goals.
There has long been strong support in Sweden for the
idea of an international system for the maintenance of peace
and law. The United Nations is a manifestation of the
efforts to achieve collective security on the long term
through a voluntarily established international system.
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Sweden will also in the future maKe every effort to
strengthen the United Nations in the work of organization to
prevent and settle international conflicts.
The ability of small states to influence international
development is limited. International affairs will, in all
probability, continue to bear the stamp of actions taken by
the great powers. In the implementation of our security
policy we must, therefore, constantly assess development
trends in the world around us and take into consideration
what risks these may involve for our security. Relations
between the super-powers and the military blo^s are charac-
terized by efforts to maintain political detente. These
efforts are partly founded on the determination to avoid any
development which may lead to nuclear war. At the same time,
it is envisaged that political disagreements between the
superpowers will persist in the foreseeable future. Both
military blocs maintain large forces in Europe and a force
posture of high military preparedness. In all probability
this high armament level will persist in the foreseeable
future. Swedish neutrality policy must therefore continue
to be supported by a strong, all-round total defence in
order to retain its credibility.
Coherent international endeavors are necessary if
lasting peace is to be achieved in the world. It cannot be
realized by national measures alone. Consequently, there is
not contradiction between Sweden's deep involvement in
international work for peace and disarmament and our efforts
to give the Swedish policy of non-participation in alliances
the support of an all-round total defence. One fundamental
precondition for Sweden's various endeavors to contribute
towards a better world is, of course, the preservation of
its independence.
It is considered that the balance of power between the
great powers will persist in the foreseeable future.
101
Consequently, in situations of international crisis, the
forces of the great powers will primarily be tied up with
each other. An attack on Sweden or parts of Swedish terri-
tory in such situations is not considered to be of primary
interest to a great power. Should such an attack neverthe-
less be contemplated, the forces the aggressoc can deploy
against us would be limited because the greater part of his
resources would have to be deployed against his prime antag-
onist. Therefore, even a small country like Sweden is able
to build up and maintain a defence which adequately supports
its security policy. Also in the future, our total defence
should have such strength, structure and preparedness that
in a situatioQ of crisis and conflict in Europe no potential
aggressor can regard threats, pressures or attacks on Sweden
as worthwhile. Then our total defence fulfills its intended
deterrent function.
The deterrent capability of our defence cannot, however,
only be judged on the basis of estimates of tha strength of
those forces which could be brought to bear upon us. A
state contemplating such an attack must also be convinced of
our will and ability to offer stubborn resistance in all
parts of the country. We must therefore inculcate respect
for our ability to lead, train, and e^uip our total defence
so that the possibilities of carrying through a successful
attack on our country appear uncertain. Our total defence
must be structured in such a way and be of such strength
that no deficiencies can give rise to doubts as to our reso-
lution of purpose. Military defence must, moreover, be
designed so that its defensive purpose is quite clear. Then
it will be impossible for anyone to interpret it as a
threat. Preparations for, and considerations of, military
cooperation with other states are quite out of the question.
Procurements of essential military equipment must not
place Sweden in a position where its dependence on other
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countries is of such a nature that it can be exploited for
putting pressure on this country.
The combination of a firm, credible foreign policy and a
strong total defence should command the respect of the great
powers for Sweden's will to remain neutral and for its
ability to resist pressures or other aggressive actions. It
must be made clear to everyone that we are intent upon
defending our policy of neutrality if need bee. It is
against this background that we maintain with steadfast
purpose a total defence which no one can disregard in such a
situation of crisis or war. Our long-range defence deci-
sions are an extension of this steadfastness of purpose.
Our total defence plays an essential role also in peace-
time. In recent decades, developments in Northern Europe
have been characterized by stability and cooperation.
Sweden's foreign policy and defence policy have made a great
contribution to the stability of the security situation
prevailing in the Nordic area. Denmark and Norway are
members of NATO. Finland combines its policy of neutrality
with a special relationship to the Soviet Union. To both
military blocs the Nordic countries constitute a flank area
where any changes of positions can have an impact on the
situation of balance now prevailing in Europe as a whole.
A substantial weakening of the strength of Swedish
defence as compared to that of other countries can upset
stability and balance in northern Europe. A firm and
consistent Swedish foreign and defence policy promotes peace
and stability in northern Europe. The pursuit of this
policy must also be in the interests of other countries.
A military attack has to be considered as the gravest
threat to our security in view of the consequences. Defence
against invasion must, therefore, be the primary task of our
total defence. Its deterrent capability conseguently still
rests primarily on the strength of military defence.
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The development of society in all industrialized coun-
tries leads, however, to increased vulnerability to other
kinds of threats and pressures. Added to this, future wars
and crises may afflict the entire society and population to
a greater extent and in other ways than before.
Consequently, total defence must be seen as an integral part
of society and reasonable account of the needs of total
defence iiust be taken in the future development of society.
A development along these lines will reduce our vulner-
ability and increase our security.
Our total defence is an expression of our determination
to safeguard the nation's security and independence. Total
defence is, therefore, the concern of the entire population
and is founded on the premise that every citizen contributes
to the best of his ability to the defence of the country.
This is why we have compulsory military service, civil
defence duty and other types of compulsory service. The
voluntary defence organizations and our popular movements
also play an important role in strengthening the foothold of
the total defence idea in our country.
With this broad conception of total defence, it is only
natural that we, as far as possible, coordinate military and
civilian functions. To this end, civilian authorities
responsible for certain functions in peace-time retain this
competence in a situation of crisis or war. Coordination of
this kind will give the principle of total defence an even
firmer foothold in our society.
For a long time there has been broad consensus in Sweden
on the orientation of our security policy and the need for a
strong defence commanding respect. One consequence of this
has been agreement on annual allocations of a considerable
proportion of national resources for defence purposes. I
attach the greatest importance to the broad popular support
of our security policy.
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APPENDIX C
STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE
(Mr. Erik Kronmark, in the new Defence Bill, 1977)
The United States and tne Soviet Jnion will in all prob-
ability continue in the foreseeable future to be tne only
states which as regards global interests, nuclear and
conventional military capacity and economic strength have
the characteristics of super-powers. Other states or groups
of states may certainly become much stronger than they are
now, but as far as can be judged will not becDiae comparable
with the super-powers, in any case not as regards military
strength.
Relations between the super-powers are marked not only
by movements towards detente but also by more or less latent
conflicts of interests. Not infreguently discussions of
detente policy have lacked clarity. This is partly due to
the fact that a distinction is not always made between the
outcome of detente policy so far and what its consequences
can be on the longer terms.
Some of the factors underlying the policy of detente
are: the increasingly conspicuous strategic balance between
the United States and the Soviet Union; the growing realiza-
tion since the Cuba crisis of the risks of war; and the
desire to check rising military expenditures. The result
has been a new psychological climate in relations between
the super-powers. It has made it possible to deal with some
very delicate international problems. These include the
relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
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Soviet Union, Poland and other East European states, the
status of Berlin and relations between the two German
states. These developments were necessary conditions for
the convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. The Conference laid the foundation for continued
efforts to extend cooperation in Europe. The next step is
the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977.
The improved negotiations climate has also made it
possible to commence extensive talks on arns limitations:
the US-Soviet talks on the limitation of strategic weapons
systems (SALT) and negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact (WP) on mutual force reductions in Central Europe
(M/B/FR) . Another outcome of the policy of detente is the
extensive international exchange of visits and a greater
degree of moderation in propaganda.
But detente efforts do not mean that the ideological
debate has come to a standstill nor that any development
towards greater similarity between social systems is
discernible.
It is difficult to judge what results detente policy can
produce in the future. It is obvious, however, that one
precondition for continued detente is that the balance of
power is such that neither need have a sense af marked mili-
tary inferiority. This means that a development towards
one-sided impairment of strength is undesirable. Sweden's
security would not be served by imbalance between the two
great power blocs in our part of the world. Agreement on
arms control and mutual force reductions in our continent
would further disarmament efforts. Work in this field so
far, however, has illustrated that the roal to decisive
progress is a long one. Therefore, continued vigorous
efforts are still necessary.
When it comes to strategic weapons a certain balance has
been achieved between the total nuclear weapon arsenals of
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the two super-powers after a long period of American superi-
ority. This balance has created the necessary coalitions
foe the talks on the limitation of strategic weapons which
began in the autumn of 1969 and which have since continued
in several rounds. One motivating factor behind the talks
is the upsurge in costs of the increasingly complicated
weapon systems.
within the framework of SALI, certain accords and agree-
ments were concluded in Moscow in 1972 and Vladivostock in
197'4. As a result the US and the Soviet Union will, on the
one hand, each have only one defensive system against stra-
tegic missiles, and on the other, freeze the number of
weapon carriers for these strategic missiles. The provi-
sional treaty which was concluded in 1972 will under an
agreement of autumn 1974 be converted into a ten-year treaty
before the end of 1977.
Later SALT deliberations have proved to be more diffi-
cult than was foreseen in the autumn of 1974. Ihis has been
due to both political and technical factors. It is quite
possible that talks are now entering a more active phase
since the new President of the United States took office.
But it is still difficult to forecast if and when a SALT II
agreement can be concluded and if it will mean a substantial
quantitative or qualitative limitation of the development of
strategic weapon systems.
As regards conventional forces, it is a fact that both
the great-power blocs still keep large forces in a state of
military preparedness in Surope. Units and weapons systems
are being constantly modernized. There is no reason to
assume that the ongoing negotiations in Vienna will give
quick results in the form of extensive force reductions.
The risk of political repercussions will probably
increase if negotiations of this kind do not produce results
in due course. It is also obvious that these negotiations
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will take time as they concern security problems of the
utmost importance to the participating states. For our
part, we have cautioned in various contexts against over-
optimism in expecting speedy results from these negotiations
vhich are of very complicated nature.
In my opinion, the political behavior of the super-
powers reflects fundamental values which will remain
unchanged eveQ if there are short-term variations in inter-
national politics or the the strength of detente policy
fluctuates at times.
The policy of detente does not mean that all causes of
conflict have disappeared. Conflicting interests between
the super-powers are expected to persist in the foreseeable
future. On the other hand, it is probably that the fluctua-
tions in internation politics may be less dramatic than
during the years of the Cold War. The present climate of
detente, regardless of whether it dates from the time after
the Cuba crisis (the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) or from
the coming into power of the Brandt jovernment in the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1969, has lasted much longer
and yielded much greater results than former periods of
detente. This has not prevented the super-powers from being
in open opposition at times in other parts of the world,
e.g. in the Middle East and Angola.
It is, of course, difficult to foresee with any degree
of certainty what consequences the policy of detente may
have in our part of the world if it lasts for a long time.
A number of possible developments could derive from the
military presence and interests of the super-powers in
Europe.
The policy of mutual understanding between the United
States and the Soviet Union has sometimes led to difficul-
ties and sometimes to conflicts of interests in the coopera-
tion between the United States and Western Europe. One the
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one hand, the United States wants to intensify its contacts
and reduce the risk of confrontation vita the Soviet Union.
Cn the other hand, it also wants to preserve the unity of
NAIO--which was created as a defense against the Soviet
Union. The attainment of both these objectives can cause
difficulties. But recent developments have shown that these
difficulties can be overcome. As far as NATO is concerned,
great concerted efforts are being made to rationalize forces
in Europe and constantly improve their equipment.
Strong demands have at times been raised in the US
Congress for the repatriation of troops. However, the
Administration has declared that American military presence
in Europe is in the interest of the nation's security and
that no reductions should be made as long as negotiations
with the Warsaw Pact on mutual force reductions are in prog-
ress in Vienna. A unilateral American withdrawal would not
only have consequences for US relations with Europe but
would also weaken the American position vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. Nor floes it seem likely that sucn unilateral reduc-
tions will be made. Western Europe's interest in a
continued American presence is apparently still just as
great. Also of importance in this context, is that the
Soviet Union, in the view of many, is in favor of a
continued American presence in Europe in the foreseeable
future.
An additional feature of this general picture is that
the position taken by the NATO states on cooperation within
the organization is not always clear-cut. On the one hand,
there is apprehension that an understanding between the
super-powers will encroach upon European interests in e.g.
the M/B/FE and SALT negotiations. On the other hand, NATO
states are aware that in the nuclear age there is no alter-
native to a policy of mutual understanding between the
super-powers and that this understanding is a precondition
for continued detente in Europe.
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The Soviet Union's relations with its allies and with
China involve or give rise to problems at times. The Soviet
Union maintains a strong military defense on the frontier to
Western Europe against NATO and in Asia against China. It
also seeks to preserve and strengthen relations with its
allies. The Soviet Union has traditionally maintained
large-scale armed forces. More than many other states, the
Soviet Union appears to still strive—despite growing
material costs--to keep its armed forces at a high quantita-
tive and qualitative level. These efforts, which in the
past few years have led among other things to the moderniza-
tion of different weapon systems, are expected to continue
also in the future.
The large scale expansion of naval forces in recent
years shows that the objectives of Soviet security policy
now also include global military presence enabling it to
support foreign policy aims. In an area previously domi-
nated by the Western alliance Soviet naval forces now count-
erbalance NATO.
Developments in recent years have shown that the prime
issues in international affairs now relate to the Middle
East and southern Africa. This does not mean, however, that
conditions in Central Europe are no longer important. There
is every reason to assume that the central parts of this
continent will continue to play a very important role in
world politics. But since several of the most important
points at issue between East and tfest have been regulated,
at the same time as international economic problems--e.g.
supplies of oil and other raw materials—gain more and more
in importance, the picture changes. As the crisis area has
shifted southwards, the stability in states around the
Mediterranean has been subjected to greater pressure than
before.
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Many states around the Mediterranean and the Persian
Gulf seem to have less resistance to disturbances than have
the industrial countries in Western Europe. This may mean
that the detente between the super-powers will be increas-
ingly put to the test in the Mediterranean region. But it
may also mean that the super-powers, being aware of these
risks, try to refine the instruments available for so-called
crisis control. Consequently, increased sensitivity to
disturbances may lead to greater vigilance in the face of
the possible spreading of future conflicts.
I would point out that the countries in southern Africa,
with abundant resources of raw materials, which are ruled by
white minority regimes (South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia)
are attracting more and more attention. The serious antago-
nisms in this region may intensify. Direct or indirect
involvement by the great powers is within the bounds of
possibility in conflicts that may occur in the future.
Should this happen, these conflicts could have far-reaching
conseguences. Although it is unlikely that they would
spread to Europe, I am of the opinion that we should keep
this complex of problems well in mind.
The strategic importance the super-powers attach to the
Nordic area derives from their ambitions in power politics
and from their mutual relations. Bearing in mind their
joint interest in preventing any development tnat can lead
to nuclear war, their strategic assessments are based on
their views of how a hypothetical future conflict might
develop, the military technical development and the possible
economic significance of the area.
In a conflict situation it is assumed that the naval
forces of the Soviet Union need to have free access to the
Atlantic, primarily from the Murmansk area, but also from
the Baltic, and that they also need to safeguard their own
operational area. In such a situation, it is further
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assumed that NATO would for it own defense find it equally
necessary to prevent this free access. These are essential
reasons why the Northern Calotte and surrounding areas, and
the areas around the Ealtic Straits, are of great strategic
importance. Conflicting interests as regards these areas
will probably persist also in the future even if the
emphasis may shift to the Northern Calotte and the
surrounding sea areas.
The military build-up on the Kola Peninsula in recent
years has attracted attention also in Sweden. It is consid-
ered that this build-up of military strength is an important
element in the Soviet Union's ambition to preserve the stra-
tegic balance between the super-powers. Regardless of the
interpretation put on the build-up, it is obvious that it is
part of the entire Northern Calotte complex, which contains
opposing interests that may give rise to conflicts.
It is not considered that there are any economic or
other resources in the Nordic countries of so essential
importance to the super-powers that they could trigger off a
conflict in the event of a serious crisis. On the other
hand, both known and new natural assets and other resources
can be of value to an aggressor.
The continued grave situation in most developing coun-
tries and the inadequacy of total development assistance
have led to an intensified international debate on ways of
remedying this serious problem. Demands for a new interna-
tional economic order have grown stronger and stronger.
However, the realization of a new economic order will be a
long and arduous process. Unless changes ace made, the
present situation may have serious consequences on the long
term. It can give rise to conflicts not only between the
industrial and the developing countries but also between the
developing countries themselves.
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As regards the United Nations, the political obstacles
to achieving collective security have meant that so far the
main significance of the world organization has been in the
setting up of norms, opinion-molding and general measures
foe preserving peace. One of the areas where Sweden has
played a certain role is that of the UN peace-keeping opera-
tions where we have contributed specially trained military
units and other personnel. Even if its importance in all
these respects has been limited, it can nevertheless be
asserted that the world without the United Nations would
have probably been even less safe and less peaceful than it
is today. But the possibility of creating the conditions
necessary for achieving satisfactory security within the
framework of an international organization and legal system,
however, still seems remote. In the final analysis, there-
fore, every nation must be responsible for its own security.
The majority of member states have declared their deter-
mination to support the United Nations as a political
instrument for the preservation of peace and the promotion
of cooperation. There have teen signs in recent years of a
broadening of the United Nations' role, from the purely
political sphere to a growing number of sectors where the
rapid advances in technology, science and communications
have created new opportunities but also new problems. These
problems have one thing in common: a great measure of
international cooperation will be required if they are to be
mastered. The broadening of the United Nations' role can in
the long term contribute to reducing tensions in the world.
So far, disarmament negotiations have mainly been
concerned with ABC weapons. The danger of the proliferation
of nuclear weapons has come increasingly into the forefront
of negotiations in international fora. In my view, the risk
of nuclear proliferation is one of the most serious interna-
tional problems. Energetic efforts must be made also in the
future to prevent such proliferation.
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The super-powers have a special responsibility when it
comes to preventing the proliferation -of nuclear weapons.
Their continued investments in builiing up their nuclear
weapon arsenals helps to nourish the notion that stocks of
nuclear weapons afford special prestige. All states have
the right to demand that the super-powers fulfil the pledges
they have given on effective measures to stop the arms race
and commence disarmament in this field.
Cf course, conventional weapons must also come into the
picture if genuine disarmament is to be achieved. But there
seems little likelihood of prompt and substantial progress
in this field. Research and development of new types of
weapons continue at a rapid pace. • Of particular importance
here are the so-called high-precision weapons.
The international situation is marked by many tensions
which lead to continuing military efforts and baild-ups even
by the poor countries. The large-scale and growing export
of arms to these countries nas become even more pronounced
in recent years.
It seems hardly likely that the efforts being made in
the arms limitation and disarmament fields will yield
conclusive results in the foreseeable future. Mistrust
between states and internal conditions make negotiations on
disarmament difficult, even if the majority are in agreement
on the desirability of getting results in this field.
Global limitation of nuclear weapons and biological and
chemical warfare is within the bounds of possibility. Even
limited progress as regards arms control can lead to a
strengthening of the status of the United Nations and its
ability to settle international disputes. Ever since the
inauguration of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in
1962, Sweden has played an incentive role in its work. It
should be noted here that Sweden took an active part in the
adoption of the decision whereby a Special Session of the UN
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General Assembly entirely devoted to disarmament will be
held in 1978.
The fact that the super-powers are alive to the possible
consequences of a future ware means that, as far as we can
judge, they will continue to make every effort to prevent
any military confrontation between them, particularly in
Europe. But the fact that huge military forces are facing
one another in a constant state of preparedness entails
risks in connection with local conflicts. The super-powers'
global interests and rivalry for resources also mean that
they may be drawn into non-European conflicts which can
escalate locally or spread to Europe.
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APPENDIX D
ADDHESS GIVEN B¥ THE PRIME MINISTER
(Mr. Thorbjorn Falldin, at a Conference of the Swedish
People and Defence Federation in Storlien, 6 February 1978)
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Sweden*s security policy is supported by an overwhelming
majority of the Swedish people. Io most people, the policy
of neutrality is self-evident in view of our historical
experience and traditions, our geographic and strategic
position and our internal conditions. The contents of this
policy--independence of military alliances, a strong mili-
tary defence compared to the size of our country, indepen-
dent standpoints in matters of foraign policy, the limits it
imposes on our participation in international trade arrange-
ments and so on--is hardly ever seriously called into
question.
This in itself is a source of strength for our security
policy. It helps us to convince the world of our
intentions.
Popular support of this policy has, of coarse, grown out
of the uniquely long period of peace enjoyed by Sweden. The
policy of neutrality was successful during two world wars.
In this we were greatly assisted by political and strategic
circumstances beyond • our control, but it is equally clear
that our policy and our own capabilities were crucially
important.
Of course, what I have now said does not preclude the
question, every now and again, whether our traditional
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security policy is unduly static and fails to make suffi-
cient allowance for the rapid changes that ara a character-
istic of both national and international developments nowa-
days. The world arounfl us today differs from that of
previous decades, with new power constellations and new
economic, technological and other outwari conditions.
As I see it, however, although the developments which
have occured are revolutionary in many ways, they have not
altered the basic conditions that apply to our policy of
neutrality. On the other hand it is clear that the forms,
contents and manifestations of that neutrality must be
continuously adapted to changes at home and abroad.
Sweden- is a comparatively small country. Sweden has a
democratic system of government. Besiias the ideological
and cultural traditions we have in common with the western
world, there are also powerful economic links. At the same
time we are at the crossroads between strategic interests of
great importance to both super-powers. One of them is our
neighbor with politically, economically and strategically
important areas in our immediate proximity.
Faced with this situation it is natural for as to avoid
coming under the influence of one super-power and, secondly,
to avoid becoming an outpost of the other one. The policy
of non-participation in alliances remains the best solution
to our security problems and, I am convinced, will continue
to be so in the foreseeable future.
The policy if non-participation in alliances gives us a
chance of achieving two vital goals. One is to keep out of
conflicts in our proximity, between the great powers. The
other is to put ourselves in a special position to help
establish a system of international detente. Our policy of
noQ-par ticipat ion is aimed at keeping Sweden Dut of interna-
tional conflicts, but it is no less aimed at promoting a
global development towards peace.
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Cur defense has an essential part to play in the
fulfillment of this policy.
It is quite natural that Sweden's position should play a
particularly important part in the maintenance of stability
in the Nordic area. Our position prevents the power blocs
in this area from confronting each other directly. To both
blocs, the Nordic area is a flank where significant changes
of position could affect the current equilibrium in Europa
(sic) .
A substantial weakening of Sweden's defense in relation
to the surrounding world could disrupt this picture of
stability and equilibrium in Northern Europe. . It could
cause added pressure from the superpowers, above all on our
neighboring countries and, in a situation of conflict, to
preparations by one bloc to prevent the other bloc from
gaining control of the Nordic area. Firmness and consis-
tency in our foreign policy and defense policy are therefore
conducive to the peace and stability of Northern Europe, and
it is also in the interests of other countries that this
policy is maintained and pursued.
Non-participation in alliances also gives us special
opportunities, through an active foreign policy in the
disarmament sector, in questions of European security, in
the United Nations and in questions of international devel-
opment, to work for a peaceful international development
which—in th ultimate analysis--is of advantage to our own
independence. In recent years international efforts for
disarmament—efforts in which, as you well know, Sweden
since long ago takes a significant part--have been deepened
and widened to include new problems and fields. This has
given us cause for a further intensification of our efforts
at the international level. I allude among other things to
the question of a new international economic order which has
arisen during the past few years and which also involves
aspects of security policy.
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k'hile on this subject I would like to emphasize that
there is no antithesis between our defense policy and our
work for international disarmament. 3oth are a part of our
security policy in its broad sense. Our efforts to promote
disarmament are aimed at making the world safer for all
countries and for ourselves too. At the same time we need a
strong defense, in relation to our size and circumstances,
in order to pursue that policy of non-participation in alli-
ances, which not only promotes peace in oar immediate
vicinity but also facilitates our work for disarmament.
Cur defense will continue to be needed foe as long as
the super-powers and the military blocs maintain large
standing forces close to our country. • As soon as the great
powers begin a process of real disarmament, we will also be
better able to reduce our military establishment. In fact,
for a number of years now, we have been setting an example
by making reductions in our military defense, which have had
no counterpart whatever in the development of armaments
around us.
I believe this view is quite widely endorsed by all
sectors of political opinion in Sweden, although recently it
has become increasingly common even for our reduced defense
establishment to be referred to as a contradiction to our
international efforts for peace.
Olof Palme once said: "A relatively strong Swedish
defense and our international work for peace are two sides
of the same policy. If in the present day situation we
should choose to disarm unilaterally, we would generate
concern and undermine the stability existing in Northern
Europe. This would threaten the European detente which
itself is a prerequisite for the work of disarmament." This
still holds good.
The policy of neutrality is only strong if it is cred-
ible. Our neutrality in war and our non-participation in
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alliances in peacetime are not internationally guaranteed or
stipulated in a treaty. Sweden's neutral line has been of
her own choosing. Consequently the credibility of this
neutrality is founded, not on international guarantees but
on the policy conducted by Sweden and by the defense meas-
ures which are already taken by us during peacetime. The
rest of the world must be able to believe both our intention
and in our ability to remain neutral in the event of war.
Cur intention may seem beyond doubt, considering our pat
record and the firm support for neutrality in this country.
But we must count n suspicion around us. Apart from non-
participation in alliances, the clearest evidence of our
intention is our investment of . considerable resources in the
maintenance of a strong total defense system.
Ke also avoid other commitments which could make our
neutrality in a future war appear illusory. We cannot
participate in a binding cooperation within a group of
states for the purpose of defining common standpoints in
foreign policy. Limits are also imposed on our ability to
participate in the transfer of decision-making powers from
national to international bodies, as witness among other
things the shaping of our commercial relations with the EC
and other economic associations.
The confidence of the surrounding world in our ability
to stay neutral in the event of war hinges above ail or. our
military defense and on our ability to protect our popula-
tion and secure our country's supply of necessary
commodities.
One perennial and fundamental question is what types of
conflicts and wars our defense should be prepared to meet
and how strong our defense must be in order to give our
security policy the necessary backing.
Our answer to this question has undergone modification
in line with the developments of strategy and weapons tech-
nology that have taken place in the post-war world.
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During the 1950's and early 1960's, the U.S. enjoyed a
clear superiority in the field of nuclear weapons, and it
was at this time that the doctrine of massive retaliation
came into being. As nuclear arsenals wers increased,
particularly by the two super-powers, a nuclear attack
seemed the likeliest method of assault, which, it was
feared, could also be used against this country in certain
situations. That was the time, too, when the question of
acquiring a Swedish nuclear weapon was debated in our
country.
Since then, however, the nuclear weapons system of the
super-powers have developed greater precision and destruc-
tive potential and have at the same time become less vulner-
able. A strategic balance has been created, also,
numerically speaking. It means that neither super-power is
capable today of delivering a massive attack on the other
without exposing itself to a devastating retaliatory strike.
This has necessitated prudence. The deterrence effect of
the so-called balance of terror has reduced the probability
of a nuclear conflict, though at the same time we are unable
to define the implications of the new weapons which are
being developed today. Massive retaliation has given way to
a doctrine with a range of options to suit the requirements
of the current situation. The demand for options has meant
a renaissance for conventional forces.
It is against this background of increasing importance
of conventional arms that Swedish strategy has been designed
in the form of what the experts call the marginal strategy.
This strategy is based on the assumption that our military
defense will not have to meet an attack by the entire
conventional forces of a super-power. We believe that
Sweden is of limited strategic interest to those around us
and that the question of attacking us can only arise in
connection with a wider conflict. A belligerent might then
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consider using Sweden as a transit route or for some other
secondary purpose.
As long as Europe remains divided into two military
blocs— which we believe it will throughout the foreseeable
future--most of the forces of the two blocs will always be
committed against each other, just as they are in Central
Europe today. A super-power contemplating an attack on
Sweden must therefore accept two limitations: it can only
detail a minor portion of its military strength for this
assignment and, secondly, it must be prepared for possible
countermeasures by the other super-power.
This being so, even a small country like Sweden is
capable of mounting a military defense that commands respect
and can make an attack appear unprofitable.
Cur existing defense has yrown out of continuous inputs
of economic resources and personnel over a long period of
time. It has been designed to meet all the threatening
situations which we believe could reasonably occur. This
has been possible within the framework of the allocated
resources, because we do not have the expense of maintaining
standing units. Our system of conscription makes it
possible to maintain a skeleton organization in peacetime
and to mobilize quickly when the need arises. On the other
hand, as tension in Europe has diminished during the seven-
ties, we have been able to reduce our annual real defense
input
.
At the same time I would like to say that the strength
of our defense on paper is one thing and that the assessment
made of it by the rest of the worii may be another. Because
we have had so many years of peace, the efficacy of our
defense has never been demonstrated. It is therefore impor-
tant for us to deal smoothly and efficiently with incidents
and border violations. It is also important that the strong
determination of the Swedish people to defend themselves be
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made known abroad. The membership of the voluntary defense
organizations, which now stands at 700,000 and is growing,
is an important factor in this connection. So too, is the
positive interest taken in defense by our major popular
movements, as witness, for example, the activities of the
People and Defence Organization, which, I need hardly add,
are a great asset.
Although the peace-keeping ability of our total defense
still rests primarily on our military resources, post-war
developments have increased the importance of other aspects,
such as economic defense and civil defense. Social develop-
ments have made the industrialized countries more suscep-
tible, to other menaces and pressures besides those of a
military nature. The oil crisis of 1973/74 is one such
example. Terrorism is another. To this is added the fact
that future wars and crises can hit entire communities and
populations on a larger scale and in a different way than
previously. We must continue to develop our society in such
a way that the exigencies of total defense ace reasonably
met.
Economic preparedness is an essential ingredient of our
total defense. DUr independence and our freedom of action
rest on our ability to safeguard the country's supplies of
essential commodities in blockade situations arising in
connection with war or crises. Post-war developments have
affected our preparedness in this regard.
Extensive international trade and international division
of labor are necessary for the continuing prosperity of our
country, and business enterprise has become increasingly
internationalized. On the other hand our economic links and
commitments must not become so strict as to make it impos-
sible for us to keep out of a European conflict between East
and West.
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Cur own views concerning the demands of our policy of
neutrality precluded Swedish membership of the European
Communities. Instead we concluded an agreement with the EC
which conferred substantial free trade benefits without
circumscribing our freedom of political action. We must
therefore continue to reserve this freedom of action in
future trade cooperation.
First and foremost our economic preparedness depends on
the peacetime resources of our economy. We can prepare for
the contingency of a blockade situation primarily by safe-
guarding a certain measure of output capacity in vital
sectors of our economy, by stockpiling raw materials and
input commodities, and by planning foe the reorganization of
our economy to an emergency footing.
Particularly severe problems have occured in the ready-
made clothing and shoe- manufacturing industries, which have
teen the subject of a host of governmental measures. We
cannot discount the possibility of more sectors or sub-
sectors of industry getting into a similar situation and
reguiring assistance. This entails structural transforma-
tion costs which too often tend to be overlooked.
Seen in context of total defense, agriculture today
presents less of a problem than it has dons. The 1967
Resolution on agricultural policy was based on the assump-
tion that agriculture would be a burden on the national
economy and that its volume should be reduced. The regui-
site level was mainly determined by considerations of
defense. Ey contrast, in the latest Resolution on agricul-
tural policy, Government and Riksdag referred to agriculture
as a valuable means of safeguarding our food supplies,
securing regional employment— also an important defense
consideration--and, last but not least, providing us with
opportunities of relieving acute food shortages in other
countries. Also, we have set a higher endurance target for
124
agriculture than for most other sectors. Car endurance in
this sector will depend among other tnings on supplies of
fuel and fertilizer.
Energy supply is the greatest problem. Whereas during
the Second World War we were entirely self-sufficient, today
we are dependent on imports--mostly of petroleum products--
for seventy percent of our energy supply. There are both
long-term and more short-term aspects to this problem.
Our long-term aim must be to reduce our dependence on
imported non-renewable raw materials. In the short term we
must alleviate the consequences of temporary disruptions of
supplies due to conflicts elswewhece in the world--peacetime
emergencies as they are called.
A rapid increase in our stockpiling of oil is one of the
measures which are being taken to this end. In addition,
our energy and fuel policy is being framed so as to make cur
supplies as dependable as possible. Allow me to remind you
in this connection that the use of nuclear power will not
increase Sweden's security in this respect as long as we are
dependent on other countries—which in practice means the
great powers— for the enrichment of our uranium.
Finally I would like to return to the subject of mili-
tary defense and to say a few words about the conditions
under which it has to operate.
There is a comprehensive process of technological devel-
opment at work within the two power blocs as regards both
nuclear and conventional weapons. This development is
expected to continue. It has increased the precision and
destructive capacity of armaments and has also entailed
other qualitative changes.
Sweden's defense is also being continuously modernized,
but at the same time we are faced with a daunting increase
in costs. Personnel costs and the costs of material mainte-
nance and advanced new equipment are rising faster than the
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allocations which are judged possible. Despite efforts to
limit peacetime operational costs, the scope for material
procurement is steadily diminishing.
A large number of measures will be taken, in accordance
with the 1977 Resolution on defease policy, to deal with
these problems. The personnel strength of to. e central
authorities and staffs will be cut by nearly 2000 by 1985.
Army, Air Force and naval units are being disbanded in rapid
succession, tut not even these expedients will be sufficient
in the long run.
More thorough changes to the military defense structure
will now have to be considered in order to achieve a reason-
able balance between duties and resources and between
personnel and equipment. The instructions concerning
perspective planning given recently to the Supreme Commander
of the Swedish Armed Forces are to be viewed against this
background. In those instructions the Supreme Commander has
been called upon also to consider alternatives involving
far-reaching structural changes. This will te the task of
the new Defence Commission too. It will not be made any
easier by the fact that it must be accomplished in a persis-
tently austere general economic climate.
At the same time I would like to make clear that the
conscription principle must continue to hold good in the
future. The passing of the 1977 Resolution on defense
policy was the latest of a succession of occasions when it
has been emphasized that total defense must be organized in
such a way as to be the concern of the entire Swedish
people. Every citizen should be given the opportunity to
contribute to the country's defense according to his
ability. This will be best accomplished if the total
defense system continues to be based on service in the form
of conscription, compulsory civil defense service and so on.
In reality we are already far along the road towards a form
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of "total defense duty" for all citizens, both men and
women. In iry opinion this defense structure shoald be still
more explicitly confirmed in the next Resolution on defense
policy.
The question of our ability to develop and produce
advanced defense equipment within this country is another
major problem. A defense industry of our own has the advan-
tage of making us less dependent on other countries and of
inducing the rest of the world to trust that we are capable
of using our equipment effectively. Also, the equipment car.
be better adapted to suit our particular defense problems.
Until now it has been possible for us to develop and
manufacture most of the defense equipment we need within the
country. Purchases from abroad have mainly been confined to
advanced items which have only been procured in small
numbers—anti-aircraft missile systems and radar installa-
tions, for instance. In cases where independent development
would have been prohibitively expensive— such as aircraft
engines and intercepter missiles— licenses have been
purchased for manufacturing in Sweden.
Despite its short manufacturing runs, the Swedish
defense industry has done well in competition with foreign
suppliers, thanks to it high technical standards, to its
adjustment to specific Swedish requirements and to the
continuity of its development and production. Moreover, it
has given us a valuable domestic cadre of technological
expertise.
At the same time our defense industry is contending with
mounting problems. For one thing, efforts to devise systems
which can be kept up-to-date for longer periods have the
effect of prolonging the intervals between development
projects and making it more difficult to maintain a conti-
nuity of know-how. Economic considerations prompt shorter
production runs, thus increasing unit costs and impairing
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competitive strength vis-a-vis foreign industry. These are
the problems facing us in the aircraft industry, and they
will soon arise in other sectors as well.
The question is, what will cost us more in the long run:
to maintain our own industry in the face of international
competition which is likely to grow tougher, or to close
down factories, write off development potential and exper-
tise and concentrate on outside procurement. This is not
only a question of vital importance to the national economy.
It is also very closely bound up with our genuine ability to
conduct an independent policy of neutrality in the event of
a war in our surroundings.
These developments set the stage for a vigorous debate
on defense during the next few years. A debate of this kind
is welcome, for it is the best guarantee that people will
penetrate the question and take an interest in it. But we
must all play our part to ensure that the debate is founded
on knowledge. As one means to this end, the Government will
try to make information more readily available on the
subject of defense. But, as I have already emphasized, the
participation of organizations, popular movements and indi-
vidual persons who are interested in defense matters will
also be required in order to achieve an open, wide and
knowledgeable debate on the subject of defense.
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